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Eliminating the Per-Child Allotment in
the AFDC Program
Marion Buckley*
I. Introduction
What we actually do for particularchildren depends upon what
we think of their parents. 1
[Ilt is a simple fact of human experience.. .that not until we see
the face of poverty do we react to it. 2

In the seemingly endless process of welfare reform, 3 one of the
latest proposals is legislation eliminating the incremental benefit
for children born to individuals enrolled in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).4 This type of reform is frequently re* J.D. 1994, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. 1981, The University of
Michigan. The author is a freelance writer in addition to running a legal research
company in Chicago. The author would like to thank Alicia Alvarez and Linda
DiCostanzo for encouraging her to pursue this topic; her husband, Bill, for his love
and support; and her father for being always willing to listen though he may not
agree.
1. Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting
Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEo. L.J. 1697, 1707 (1993).
2. In the Matter of Petitioner for Rulemaking, 117 N.J. 311, 322 (1989) [hereinafter "Rulemaking"].
3. Some of the more recent amendments to AFDC have included the following:
requiring AFDC applicants to assign to the state any rights to receive child support
payments, 42 U.S.C. § 602(aX26XA) (Supp. III 1982); requiring maternal AFDC recipients to cooperate with the state in determining the paternity of nonmarital children, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26XB) (Supp. III 1982); allowing the AFDC family to keep
the first $50 of child support collected by the state and prohibiting the state from
including that amount as income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(8XAXvi), 657(b)(lXSupp. III
1982); implementing mandatory income withholding, 42 U.S.CA. § 666(aXlXWest
1988); requiring the Internal Revenue Service to withhold income tax refunds to persons in arrears on child support payments, 42 U.S.CA. § 664 (a)(2XA)(West 1988);
and implementing expedited procedures for obtaining and enforcing child support,
42 U.S.C.A. § 666(aX3), (4), (6), (7), (8), and (9) (West 1988); denying benefits to families headed by a parent under 18 years of age who has never married, unless that
family resides with an adult relative or in a supervised supportive service living
arrangement, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(43)(1990). See also Bowen v. Giliard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987) (involving a challenge to AFDC amendments resulting from the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984), infra note 138 and accompanying text; Christa Anders, State
Intervention into the Lives of Single Mothers and Their Children, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 567, 583-85 (1990) (discussing changes in the AFDC program since 1975).
4. Such legislation has already been adopted and is currently in force in New
Jersey. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (West 1993)("[t]he Commissioner of Human
Services shall revise the schedule of benefits to be paid to [an AFDC family] ... by
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ferred to as "family cap" legislation,5 which implies that the amount
of funding allowed under the AFDC program is based on the size of
the family. In fact, laws eliminating the per-child allotment call for
eliminating the benefits only for children born to families already
enrolled in the AFDC program. 6 These laws do not eliminate the
per-child allotments of benefits to families whose children were
born prior to enrollment in AFDC.7 Since this legislation is based
not on family size but on the timing of childbirth, I refer to it as
elimination of the per-child allotment.
eliminating the increment in benefits under the program for which that family would
otherwise be eligible as a result of the birth of a child .... ."). A pilot program implementing reduction or elimination of the per-child allotment to some AFDC families
began in Wisconsin in July 1994. Telephone Interviews with Jean Sheil, Project Director, Bureau of Welfare Initiatives, State of Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social
Serv. (Nov. 17, 1993), Sandra Parr, administrative assistant (Oct. 13, 1994). Under
the Wisconsin measure, which is part of a program known as the Parental and Family Responsibility Initiative (PFRI), the AFDC benefit received by teen parents will
be reduced by about half for the second child, and will be eliminated for the third
child. Id.; WISCONSIN WELFARE REFORM, THE PARENTAL AND FAM. RESP. INrrIATIVE,
ExEcUTrvE SUMMARY, at 2, 4 (April 1992) [hereinafter WISCONSIN ExEcuTrvE SumMARY]; REPORT ACCOMPANYING APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL WAIVER, GRANT APPLICA-

No. 87-3-WR-WI-004, at 2, 17-19 (Mar. 13, 1992) [hereinafter WISCONSIN
GRANT APPLICATION]. That is, families targeted by the Parental and Family Responsibility Initiative ("PFR families") would receive about $38 less than non-PFR families when a second child is bern, and the PFR families would receive no additional
benefits when a third or subsequent child is born. Id. at 19. Single-parent non-PFR
families currently receive an additional $100 when a third child is born, while twoparent non-PFR families currently receive an additional $91 when a third child is
born. Id. The Wisconsin program is targeted at teens who are newly enrolled in the
AFDC program and who are first-time parents. Id. at 2. See also, WISc. STAT. ANN.
49.25 (1992) (setting forth the parameters of the PFRI pilot program). Lucy Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals,
102 YALE L.J. 719, 736 n.109 (1992Xdiscussing the Wisconsin pilot program). The
Clinton Administration also has approved demonstration plans to implement laws
similar to New Jersey's in Georgia and in Arkansas. David A. Price, Activist Lawyers Fight Welfare Reform in New Jersey (Apr. 8, 1994) (unpublished legal opinion
letter, on file with the Washington Legal Foundation); Arkansas Reduction in AFDC
Birth Rates Project, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 585 (1994). Applications for similar demonstration projects in California and Maryland reportedly are pending. William
Claiborne, Reluctant Allies Oppose Clinton 'Family Cap' Welfare Proposal, WASH.
POST, May 27, 1994, at Al.
5. Williams, supra note 4, at 720; Alan Houseman, Advocacy Responses to State
Budget Cuts and Reform Proposals, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 731, 733 (1992).
6. See, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (West 1993) (eliminating incremental benefit for any child born into a family enrolled in AFDC). See also, Wis. LEGISLATIVE
TION

REFERENCE BUREAU, A SUmMARY OF THE PARENTAL AND FAm. RESP. INrrIATIVE, at 4

(1992) [hereinafter WISCONSIN BRIEFS] (providing for incremental benefit for one
child, but halving the grant for second child and eliminating the grant for any subsequent children).
7. New Jersey Pub. Hearing on Assembly Bill Nos. 4700-4705 Before Assembly
Health and Hum. Serv. Comm., 4 (Oct. 22, 1991) (statement by bill sponsor Assemblyman Wayne R. Bryant) [hereinafter New Jersey Hearings].
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Legislation that eliminates the per-child allotment essentially
removes the incremental benefits traditionally granted to AFDC
families upon the birth of a child.9 The legislation is intended to
accomplish two goals: conservation of state funds and modification
of behavior among AFDC recipients (that is, encourage employment
and discourage childbirth). 10 Whether this legislation is capable of
accomplishing either goal is questionable."1 The legislation also
8. The incremental benefit is the per-child grant provided to AFDC families.
Nationwide, the average monthly allotment per child is $40-$60. In New Jersey the
benefit per child is $64 per month. Changesin State Welfare Reform Programs:Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Social Security and Fam.Policy of the Comm. on
Finance, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992) (statement of Wayne Bryant, Assemblyman,
New Jersey State Assembly) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
9. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (1993); Irene Lurie, Major Changes in
the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 CORNELL L. Rsv. 825, 826
(1974)(discussing the early years of the AFDC program).
10. New Jersey Hearings,supra note 7 (statement to Assembly Bill 4703); WISCONSIN BRIEFS, supra note 6.
11. Legislators have acknowledged that they "can not readily determine" how
much money might be saved. New Jersey Hearings,supra note 7 (legislative fiscal
estimate). Opponents assert that there is no empirical evidence to support the claim
that the level of AFDC benefits has any effect on childbearing decisions. New Jersey
Pub. Hearing on Assembly Bill Nos. 4700-4705 Before Assembly Health and Hum.
Serv. Comm., 16X (July 30, 1991)(statement by Joseph Bordo, Chair, and Edward
O'Connor, Executive Director, New Jersey Chapter of Nat'l Ass'n of Social Workers)
("The concept that there is an [sic] cottage industry among poor women of having
babies for the welfare money is factually unfounded."); HUM. RESOURCES AND COMMuNrry DEv. Div., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR ADOLESCENT
MOTHERS, 43 (1990) [hereinafter ADOLESCENT MOTHERS] ("Studies... find no evi-

dence that benefit levels encourage childbearing."). Since the New Jersey law has
been in force, some sources cite a slight decrease - approximately 10% - in births
to welfare mothers, but experts warn that such reports have not made clear to what
extent the figures reflect the underreporting of births or can be attributed to factors
other than the new law. Barbara Vobejda, Gauging Welfare's Role in Motherhood:
Sociologists Question Whether 'Family Caps'Are a Legitimate Solution, WASH. POST,
June 2, 1994, at Al; 60 Minutes: The $64 Question, May 15, 1994. But see RANK,
infra note 79 (noting that women on welfare tend to have lower birth rates than
other women); Kerr, infra note 67; Sydell, infra note 86.
In regard to the goal of encouraging AFDC recipients to seek employment, it
should be noted that other means are already in place to meet these objectives. See,
e.g., New JerseyHearings, supra note 7 (discussing the Family Development Initiative, Assembly Bill 4700, and noting that the objective is "to enable recipients of
[AFDC] to secure permanent full-time unsubsidized jobs, preferably in the private
sector.., and to ensure that these individuals... obtain the necessary educational
skills and vocational training, as appropriate, to secure these kinds of jobs. .. ").
The scarcity of jobs is also a factor in whether this legislation can work. See ANDREw
HACKER, Two NATIONS, BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HosTILE, UNEQUAL 101-06
(1992); Jason DeParle, Trying to Make Teenagers Tomorrow's Skilled Workers, N.Y.
Tams, Nov. 26, 1992, at Al, D15. Both sources discuss the disappearance ofjobs for
unskilled workers and the corresponding steep declines in salaries for these workers
over the past 20 years, noting that welfare families are often unable to procure the
jobs that are available, and that even if jobs were available and the AFDC parent
was qualified for the jobs, the costs of childcare often more than offset the wages
earned. See Number of Americans in Poverty Rises for Fourth Straight Year, DAILY
LABOR REPORT, Oct. 7, 1994 ("[Economic Policy Institute economists] ... noted that
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may violate the Social Security Act12 and the U.S. Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.13 Although over
a dozen states appear to be considering this legislation14 and the
Clinton Administration recently endorsed these measures, 15 New
Jersey is the only state in which the law has been enacted and is
currently in force. 16 For that reason, and because other states' proposals are similar to New Jersey's,'7 this article focuses on the law
as enacted in New Jersey.
the wages for the vast majority of the workforce have been eroding since 1979 due to
the 'weakening of labor-market institutions (such as a lower minimum wage, weaker
unions), the expansion of low-wage service employment, import pressures, and corporate downsizings.' "); MARIAN WRIGHT EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL 92 (1987) (re-

porting that 60% of all adults in AFDC families have not received a high school
education and that at least one in four has no prior work experience); Anders, supra
note 3, at 569 (stating that the reasons so many households headed by single women
are in poverty in the first place is lack of education, lack of jobs, and lack of affordable daycare, as well as wage discrimination); Adolescent Mothers, supra at xi (citing
low educational attainment and inadequate job skills as characteristic of young
mothers).
12. See infra notes 18-27, 111 and accompanying text (noting that the purpose of
the AFDC program, which was enacted as part of the Social Security Act, is to encourage the care of dependent children.); Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.
1994) (invalidating California AFDC measure that reduced benefits across the board
without proper review by HHS).
13. See infra notes 180-186 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional
guarantee to Equal Protection under State and Federal laws). In fact, the New
Jersey law has been challenged by a coalition of legal groups, who argue that the law
violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. and
New Jersey constitutions, as well as federal statutes and regulations governing
AFDC, family planning services, and research on human subjects. Price, supra note
4. The lawsuit was filed Dec. 1, 1993. Id.
14. Similar bills have been discussed by legislators in California, 1993 CA A.B.
2289, 1993-94 Reg. Sess., April 19, 1993; Colorado, 1993 CO H.B. 1199, 59th Gen.
Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., April 23, 1993; Florida, 1992 FL H.B. 131 and 1992 FL S.B.
1378, 1992 Reg. Sess., Jan. 14, 1992; and Illinois, 1991 H.B. 3682, 87th Gen. Assembly, 1991-92 Reg. Sess., April 9, 1992, and 1991 IL S.B. 1540, 87th Gen. Assembly,
1991-92 Reg. Sess., March 31, 1992. Legal publications have also reported that similar legislation has been discussed in Maine, South Carolina, and Virginia, Center on
Social Welfare Policy and Law, The New Welfare Cutbacksand LitigationResponses,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 756, 760 (1992) [hereinafter New Welfare Cutbacks]. Demonstration projects have been approved for Georgia and Arkansas, (Price, supra note 4;
Arkansas Reduction in AFDC Birth Rates Project, supra note 4), and legislators in
Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oregon also have discussed similar AFDC
legislation.
15. Vobejda, supra note 11; Ronald Brownstein, White House Backs Initiatives to
Restrict IllegitimateBirths, HOUSTON CHRON., May 22, 1994, at A4.
16. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (West 1993).
17. See, e.g., 1992 FL H.B. 131 and 1992 FL S.B. 1378, 1992 Reg. Sess, Jan. 14,
1992 (stating that the bill is designed, in part, to "discourage the birth of additional
children, among recipients," by, inter alia, eliminating the incremental benefit for a
child born while the family is enrolled in AFDC); 1991 IL H.B. 3682, 87th Gen. Assembly, 1991-92 Reg. Sess., April 9, 1992, (stating, "[a] family unit receiving aid...
shall not receive, on account of the birth of a child... any increase in the amount of
financial aid... ."); 1993 CA A.B. 2289, 1993-94 Reg. Sess., April 19, 1993 ("This bill
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This article will provide an overview of AFDC, discussing the
origins and purposes of the program and how AFDC legislation
should be analyzed in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Next,
it will address the arguments in support of and in opposition to the
law. Moreover, this article will look at other legislation designed to
reduce state expenditures on AFDC. In conclusion, this article will
discuss the per-child allotment legislation, focusing on the New
Jersey statute, which may violate the Social Security Act and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Originally known as Aid to Dependent Children, 18 AFDC was
established as part of the Social Security Act of 1935.19 Initially,
AFDC was the federal government's response to states' inability to
provide adequate pension payments to widows and their dependent
children 2O during the Great Depression. 2 1 From the outset, the fedwould prohibit.., the inclusion of a child conceived while either the father or the
mother of the child is receiving aid on behalf of an eligible child.... ."); 1992 CO H.B.
1302 ("For a[n AFDC] household in which an addition [sic] child is born, the needs of
such child shall not be considered in calculating the monthly AFDC grant for the
household.").
18. Lurie, supra note 9, at 827 (citing Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543,
§ 104(a)(2), 76 Stat. 185 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970)).
19. Id. at 826-27 (citing Social Security Act of 1935, Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396g (1970)).
20. Id. at 826. Under the mothers' pension laws established by the states in the
early part of the 20th century, states provided aid to widowed, disabled, or deserted
parents in an effort to enable the children of those parents to remain at home and be
cared for by their families. Id. Prior to enaction of these laws, children whose parents couldn't support them were institutionalized. Id. Initially, the AFDC program
did not include "unsuitable" mothers, such as unwed or divorced mothers. CHIuSTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 2 (1992); Lurie, supra note 9, at 828. Gradually, however, the AFDC program was transformed so that it "became mainly a
program for unwed, separated and divorced mothers." JENCKS, supra, at 2. Jencks
notes that this focus caused the AFDC program to become unpopular and controversial: "Since most Americans were still strongly opposed to both unwed motherhood
and divorce, a program that sanctioned and even rewarded such behavior was bound
to be unpopular." Id. The author cites the "endless controversy over [AFDC]" as one
reason Congress has been reluctant to make other kinds of social policy. Id. He also
notes that the portion of the AFDC program that provided benefits to "two-parent
families in which the husband was disabled and had never contributed to the socialsecurity system ... has never aroused much controversy." Id. at 237 n.2.
For a discussion of the "deserving" poor versus the "undeserving" poor, see
Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEo.
L.J. 1499, 1505-09 (1991); HACKER, supra note 11, at 84 ("Virtually everyone agrees
that [AFDC]-commonly called "welfare"-requires radical reform, if not outright
abolition."); NATHAN GLAZER, THE LmiTs OF SOCIAL POLICY 21 (1988) ("AFDC by
1970 was no longer a widows' program: it was not even a program primarily for
divorced women, or women whose husbands had deserted them. It was increasingly
a program for the mothers of illegitimate children .... It had become a program for
blacks, who made up about half of the recipients of welfare aid. That there should be
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eral government left the responsibility for administering the program up to the states. 22 Recently, the federal government passed
legislation enabling states to obtain "waivers" from the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (HHS).23 These waivers allow the Secretary to approve state welfare programs that have not been re-

viewed by HHS officials.24 Some sources express concern that the
waiver process has enabled states to implement program changes
in AFDC that directly conflict with the purposes of the AFDC pro-

gram and thus otherwise would not be approved.25
The purpose of the AFDC program is to encourage the care of
dependent children26 in their own homes or the homes of relatives
more family breakup and more illegitimacy among blacks than whites was understandable in view of the hard economic circumstances under which blacks lived as
compared to whites, the particularly great difficulty black men encounter in finding
stable jobs, the inferior education blacks received.)" Id. at 23; Houseman, supra note
5, at 733 ("Today, the public perceives the welfare system, particularly the AFDC
program, as out of control. Instead of encouraging work, it is perceived as rewarding
those who do not work.").
21. Lurie, supra note 9, at 826.
22. Id. at 827. "Congress gave relatively little attention to AFDC in drafting the
Social Security Act, anticipating that a fully developed social security program
would provide for widows and orphans and that the need for AFDC would 'Wither
away.'" See also GLAZER, supra note 20, at 21 ("[Ilt was expected that the numbers
of [women and children receiving welfare assistance] would not be large and would
decline as the social security system came to maturity.").
23. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1115. Under this section of the Social Security Act, "the Secretary of HHS may waive federal AFDC requirements to allow a state to run an experimental project that the Secretary deems 'is likely to assist in promoting the
objectives of' the AFDC program." New Welfare Cutbacks, supra note 14, at 756.
24. New Welfare Cutbacks, supra note 14, at 756.
25. Id. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 39 (statement of Robert
Greenstein, Executive Director, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington,
D.C.) (I am very concerned... about a potential misuse of the Federal waiver process. I am not suggesting ...
indiscriminate opposition to waivers. But neither
should there be indiscriminate approval of waivers.... I think we need to look very
carefully at what are the proper uses of waivers here."); Center on Social Welfare
Policy and Law, Welfare in 1994: Inadequate Benefits, Time Limits, and Arbitrary
Administration?, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 1001, 1009 (1994) (describing the waiver
system and stating of demonstration projects recently approved via waivers, "These
projects were approved despite recipient opposition and indicate, especially in the
case of Wisconsin, that HHS stands ready to approve virtually any state proposal, no
matter how repugnant to the underlying purposes of the AFDC program.... HHS
has responded [to President Clinton's affirmation of the waiver system] by approving
virtually whatever the states want to do, without regard to the harm to poor families
or how a proposal fits in with the President's plans for welfare reform."); Beno v.
Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating California measure which reduced AFDC benefits, and reviewing the requirements under the waiver program).
26. "Dependent child" is defined as:
[A] needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by
reason of the death, continued absence from the home (other than absence occasioned solely by reason of the performance of active duty in
the uniformed services of the United States), or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfa-
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and to help maintain and strengthen family life.27 Robert Green-

stein, Executive Director of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington, D.C., reported that many states have reduced
the funding levels of their AFDC programs in recent years 28 in response to the states' "large deficits" brought on by the recent economic recession. 2 9 Calling the cuts "a classic case of a tough budget
crunch,"30 Greenstein stated that most of the cuts were not aimed
at encouraging behavioral changes among AFDC recipients, but
rather were implemented solely to save money. 3 1 This has resulted

ther, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother,
stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own
home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) at the option
of the State, under the age of nineteen and a full-time student in a secondary school (or the equivalent level of vocational or technical training), if, before he attains age nineteen, he may reasonably be expected
to complete the program of such secondary school (or such training).
42 U.S.C.S § 606(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
27. 42 U.S.C.S. § 601 (Law. Co-op. 1985). The Social Security Act states:
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their
own homes or the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish
financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children
and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain
and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain
or retaincapabilityfor the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuingparental care and
protection, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal
year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this part.
Id. (emphasis added).
Although the Social Security Act has been interpreted to mean that basic necessities must be provided to AFDC children, the Supreme Court has limited the meaning of "basic necessities," holding that the term did not include such items as medical
expenses. Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 (1986).
28. Senate Hearings,supra note 8, at 35 (statement of Robert Greenstein)
[I]n 1991, 40 states froze or cut AFDC benefits, nine states cut the basic
benefit outright, 12 states, many of them in addition to the nine I just
mentioned, cut special needs, payments, or emergency assistance;
sometimes emergency assistance for homeless families. These were the
deepest cuts in at least a decade in AFDC.... [Blefore these cuts took
place.., the Congressional Research Service figures show that the benefit in the median state for a family with no other income was 42 percent below the 1972 level.
Id. See also Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Welfare Law Developments,
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1175, 1178 (1993) [hereinafter Welfare Developments] (reporting that "overall there was a continuing erosion of [AFDC] benefits" in 1992).
29. Senate Hearings,supra note 8, at 37.
30. Id. at 37-38.
31. Id. at 36.
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in a system that provides benefits that are below the poverty levelS2
33
in every state.
The AFDC program is a joint endeavor between the federal
government and the states, with states participating in the program on a voluntary basis and the federal government reimbursing
a percentage of the monies the states expend.34 If a state agrees to
participate in the AFDC program, the state must administer its
AFDC program in conformity with federal regulations.35 In part,
those regulations require the states to provide aid to all eligible
families in a reasonably prompt manner;3 6 to assure that the funds
are used to further the best interests of the child;37 to provide for
development of a birth control program targeted to each "appropriate" individual in the AFDC household so that out-of-wedlock births
will be reduced or prevented and family life will be strengthened;Ss

32. The poverty level is defined by the Social Security Administration, which in
1964 devised a poverty index based solely on monetary income. U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 426 (1992) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. The poverty level for a three-person household was $10,419 in 1990, up
from $6,565 in 1980. Id. at 427, citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P-60, No. 175. For a four-person household, the poverty level in
1990 was $13,359, up from $8,414 in 1980. Id. As of 1993, the poverty level for a
family of four was $14,763. DAILY LABOR REPORT, supra note 11. In 1993, 39.3 million Americans, or 15.1% of the population, lived in poverty, and 22.7% of all children lived in poverty. Id. Since 1989, the real median family income has fallen
6.9%, or $2,737. Id.
33. Welfare Developments, supra note 28, at 1179. The combined assistance
available to a family from AFDC and food stamps was below the poverty level in
every state, and below 75% of the poverty level in 41 states. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C.S. § 603 (Law. Co-op. (1985 & Supp. 1994)).
35. Id. § 602.
36. Id. § 602(10)(A)."[Alid to families with dependent children shall.., be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals...." Id.
37. Id. § 605.
Whenever the State agency has reason to believe that any payments of
aid to families with dependent children made with respect to a child are
not being or may not be used in the best interests of the child, the State
agency may provide for such counseling and guidance services with respect to the use of such payments and the management of other funds
by the relative receiving such payments as it deems advisable in order
to assure use of such payments in the best interest of such child, and
may provide for advising such relative that continued failure to so use
such payments will result in substitution therefor of protective payments... or in seeking appointment of a guardian or legal representative.., or in the imposition of criminal or civil penalties ....
Id.
38. Id. § 602 (15A). This section states that family planning services should be
offered to those individuals who voluntarily request them and adds that acceptance
of family planning services "shallnot be a prerequisite to eligibility for or the receipt
of any other service under the plan." Id. (emphasis added).

1994]

ELIMINATING THE PER-CHILD ALLOTMENT

177

and to adjust figures on which the standard of need is based in or9
der to reflect cost-of-living changes.3
Although states must establish a standard of need, states need
not make payments equal to that standard.40 However, anyone
whose income exceeds 185% of the state's standard of need is ineligible for AFDC benefits.41 The U.S. Supreme Court, in holding that
AFDC payments need not equal the state standard of need, anticipated that legislators would feel pressure to set welfare payments
in accordance with the wishes of the voters.42 States are required
to reevaluate their standards of need every three years, reporting
the results of their evaluation to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services 4 3 and the public. 44
Courts have invalidated some state laws pertaining to the
AFDC program, 45 and some commentators suggest that the courts
are a necessary intervenor in AFDC legislation because the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) more often takes the
side of the state than the side of individuals disputing state AFDC

39. Id.

§

602 (23): "[Bly July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine

the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living
costs since such amounts were established, and any maximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted."
Id.
40. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2Xii)(1993); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413
(1970); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 538 (1972).
41. Rulemaking, 117 N.J. 311, 320 (1989) (citing the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, Pub.L. No. 98-369, § 2621, 98 Stat. 494, 1134).
42. Id. at 321-23 (discussing Justice Harlan's holding in Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397 (1970)).
43. Id. at 321 (citing Family Support Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-185, § 404, 102
Stat. 2343, 2398).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., id.; Ledbetter v. Baldwin, 107 S. Ct. 635 (1986) (stating that method
of determining grant violated due process); Pahle v. Adult and Fain., 696 P.2d 1135
(Or. App. 1985) (invalidating Oregon statute because it was more restrictive than
federal law). But see Tello v. McMahon, 677 F. Supp. 1436 (1988 E.D. Cal. 1988)
(upholding a "devastating penalty"). See infra, notes 108-229 and accompanying
text (discussing AFDC challenges decided by the Supreme Court).
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legislation.46 Experts also express concern over the increasing
number of waivers being granted to state programs. 47
1.

AFDC Benefits

The AFDC system is the focus of intense scrutiny and controversy,48 and state legislatures are expending a great deal of time
attempting to reduce the AFDC rolls.49 This can probably be attributed to the fact that AFDC accounted for just over half of all cash
aid provided in 1990 by state and local governments-$9.6 billion
in AFDC benefits, compared to $18.1 billion for all cash benefits5O

-

and just under a third of all cash aid provided by the federal

government - $11.5 billion in AFDC benefits, compared to $37 billion for all cash benefits.51 In total, AFDC funds in 1990 accounted
46. Richard Wills Hubbard, Bacon v. Toia: The Case of an Administrative
Agency's Equal Protection Standard,55 TEmP. L.Q. 1, 14 (1982). The author notes
that the states exhibit a "great reluctance to disapprove questionable state plan provisions," which requires the intervention of the Court if unconstitutional laws and
programs are to be invalidated. Id. at 14 n.76 (citing as examples Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397 (1970) and Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972)). In Rosado,
HEW approved a New York plan that established a benefits computation scheme
which the U.S. Supreme Court later held to be in violation of the Social Security Act.
In Carleson, HEW allowed a California plan that denied AFDC benefits to families
in which a parent's absence-and consequent lack of support-was due to military
service; the U.S. Supreme Court also found this scheme to be in violation of the Social Security Act). Id.
47. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 20 (discussing the changes in the AFDC program and providing various authors' comments regarding public opinion on the AFDC program);
Lurie, supra note 9, at 825 ("AFDC is criticized as being both inadequate and inequitable, and many critics argue that AFDC has increased dependency on welfare by
encouraging marital instability, migration to urban ghettoes, and withdrawal from
the labor force.").
49. See supra note 28 (noting that recent cuts in state AFDC programs have
been the deepest in at least a decade).
50. STATISTICAL ABsTRACT, supra note 32, at 357.
51. Id. In 1991, total AFDC benefit payments were $20.3 billion. Adele M. Blong
and Timothy J. Casey, AFDC ProgramRules for Advocates: An Overview, CLERMucGHOUSE REv., 1164, 1165 (1994).
As with any statistical analysis, it is crucial that the observer maintain an overall perspective. For example, in terms of AFDC funding, the fact that the monies
provided to AFDC recipients account for less than one percent of all state expenditures and less than 10% of all public aid expenditures is far more telling than the
fact that AFDC funds account for just over half of all cash aid provided by the state
and local governments.
By analogy, consider a business that spends $1,000 per week, including payroll,
rent, insurance, and so forth. Operating costs account for 60% of the company's annual expenditures, and half of the operating costs constitute salaries. (The percentages and ratios used in this illustration reflect those of the national government's
budget, as reported in the Statistical Abstract). Assume the company provides free
bus passes to about 13% of its workers. (The percentage is analogous to the number
of Americans who receive non-cash benefits.) The bus passes, which represent noncash assistance, account for 8% of the company's annual expenditures. Let's also say
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for nine percent of all public welfare expenditures at the state level
and about thirty-five percent at the federal level.52 Total public

welfare expenditures accounted for 9.3% of all state and local expenditures in 1990 (and 2.5% of all federal expenditures).5 3 Thus,
AFDC funds account for less than one percent of all government
expenditures - at both the federal and the state and local levels.s4
The federal government provides about fifty-four percent of
the cash benefits received by AFDC families; states supply the remainder.55 Because the per-child allotment legislation has been
enacted only in New Jersey,5 6 it is important to assess the funding
levels in that state. In New Jersey, the state spent $533,594,000 on
AFDC maintenance assistance payments in fiscal year 1993, providing benefits to an average of 349,388 recipients, or roughly
125,930 families per month.57 As of May 1994, the maximum family grant for a family of four was $488 in New Jersey,5 8 up slightly
from the 1989 level of $443 per month,59 which was less than sixty
this company provides cash assistance to about 4% of its workforce (the same percentage of Americans receiving AFDC). The cash assistance accounts for less than
1% of the company's annual expenditures, but constitutes 54% of its cash expenditures. When the CFO is looking to cut costs, he would save the company more
money overall if he trimmed some of the operating costs or reduced the amount of
expenditures going toward bus passes than if he eliminated all of the cash assistance. The same holds true for AFDC and other welfare programs: the government
would save more money overall if it even just slightly trimmed its operating costswhich account for 35.2% of all federal expenditures and 60.7% of all state and local
expenditures-than if it completely eliminated all cash grants.
The dilemma between cash and non-cash grants is further illustrated by a recent discussion among legislators in which Douglas Besharov, Scholar in Residence,
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., noted that as states reduce the
cash grants state governments provide to AFDC recipients, those recipients obtain
increased aid from the federal government in the form of food stamps. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 25-26.
52. STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT, supra note 32, at 356-57. AFDC funds accounted for
15% of all government expenditures on welfare-federal, state, and local spending
combined. Id.
53. Id., at 280, Table No. 450.
54. Id. One writer reports that the total dollar amount of federal and state
spending for AFDC was $128 billion less than the government spent on the savingsand-loan bailout. Charles Sennott, Liberals Finding the Aid System is Broken, BosTON GLOBE, May 17, 1994, at 1.
55. STATisTicAL ABsTRAcr, supra note 32, at 357.
56. See supra note 4.
57. Facsimile transmission from H. Lieberman, Office of Family Assistance,
Washington, D.C. (May 18, 1994). The U.S. government spent a total of
$22,553,082,000 during fiscal year 1993. Id. In fiscal 1986, New Jersey provided
35% of the funds for its AFDC program, the county provided 15%, and the federal
government provided the remainder. Rulemaking, 117 N.J. at 313.
58. Office of Family Assistance, supra note 57.
59. Rulemaking, 117 N.J. at 317.
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percent of the minimum cost of living in New Jersey at that time.60

The cost of living in New Jersey increased over 130% between 1975
and 1985, but AFDC payments increased only thirty-three percent
during that period.61 The same is true for most other states. 6 2
Nationwide, the average monthly AFDC benefit for the typical, three-person family was $390 in 1990.63 The AFDC payment
constituted ninety-two percent of the cash income available to these
families. 6 4 The average annual cash grant received by an AFDC
family in 1990 was $4,644, with cash allowances ranging from

$1,356 in Alabama to $7,692 in Massachusetts.65 Overall, the cash
benefits supplied by AFDC amount to about one-seventh of the av6
erage income of American families.6

Some experts report that children in AFDC families already
are receiving less than half the funds that families need to lead a
safe, healthy life. 6 7 Others report that most states' AFDC grants
combined with food stamps provide support that reaches only seventy percent of the poverty level, with no state providing assistance
that would bring a mother of two up to the poverty level.6 8 Overall,
AFDC benefits already have been cut by forty-two percent since
1970.69
60. Id. at 316-17. As of May 18, 1994, the maximum grant for a family of four
was $488. Office of Family Assistance, supra note 57.

61. Id.
62. See supra notes 8-33 and accompanying text.

63. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., CHARACTERISTICS AND FIN. CIRCUMSTANCES OF AFDC REcIPIENTs 2 (1990)[hereinafter AFDC REcEixNTs].
64. Id. at 2. About 20% of AFDC families had earned income in 1990. In over
80% (five-sixths) of the families with earned income, the mother was the income
earner. Id.
65. HACKER, supra note 11, at 86. See also Rulemaking, 117 N.J. at 317 (quoting
Tello v. McMahon, 677 F.Supp. 1436, 1445 (E.D. Cal. 1988X"[T]he devastating truth
is that few States, if any, define need at, much less above, the poverty level").
66. HACKER, supra note 11, at 86.
67. New Jersey Hearings,supra note 7, at 15 (statement by Melville Miller, President, Legal Services of New Jersey, July 9, 1991); Id. at 44 (statement of Martha
Davis, Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund); Peter Kerr, Trenton LegislatorProposes Overhaul of Welfare System, N.Y. TnMEs, Apr. 9, 1991, at B4
(citing David Sciarra, Acting Director, Division of Public Interest Advocacy, New
Jersey Public Advocate).
68. Andrew Ward, When the Republicans Told My Wife that They Care, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 1991, at A21 (citing the Center on Budget and Policy). See also
Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Welfare Law Developments, CLEARIGHOUSE REV., 1074, 1076 (Jan. 1991)[hereinafter Welfare Developments II]; ADoLEsCENT MOTHERS, supra note 11, at 41 (noting that the maximum benefits for a twoperson family in the 48 contiguous states ranged from 12% of the poverty level in
Alabama to 77% in California).
69. Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Welfare Law Developments,
CLEARINGHOUSE REv., 1283, 1284 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter Welfare Developments III].
See also Welfare in 1994, supra note 25 (providing additional data on poverty and
welfare in general and AFDC); Blong, supra note 51.
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Characteristics of AFDC Recipients

Despite common perceptions that the AFDC program constitutes welfare for black mothers of illegitimate children,70 or that
the average welfare family has "half a dozen children, headed by a
mother who has been in the program for at least a dozen years," 7 1
the reality is quite different.
The number of individuals receiving AFDC is almost equally
divided between white and black families: 39.7% of AFDC recipients in 1990 were black, 38.1% were white, 16.6% were Hispanic,
2.8% were Asian, and 1.3% were Native American.72 About eleven
million Americans receive AFDC benefits, 73 two-thirds of whom are
children.74 About half the enrollees voluntarily leave the AFDC
program within three years; 75 the median enrollment period is
70. GLAZER, supra note 20, at 23. See infra note 87.
71. HACKER, supra note 11, at 86. See infra note 87.
72. AFDC REcPIEN'rs, supra note 63, at 1. The demographics of Americans receiving AFDC and those living in poverty are substantially different: of the 33.5 million Americans in poverty as of March 1991, two-thirds, or 22.3 million, were white.
Id. That constitutes 10.7% of the white population. By contrast, less than one-third,
or 9.8 million, were black. Id. That translates to 31.9% of the black population. Id.
Additionally, 34% of white single mothers receive AFDC, compared with over 50% of
black and Hispanic single mothers. HACKER, supra note 11, at 86. (Note that in
total numbers the vast majority of Americans in poverty were white, but with whites
constituting the vast majority of the population in the United States, the proportion
of the white population that was living in poverty was much lower than for blacks.)
The demographic discrepancy between the populations in poverty and those receiving AFDC-i.e., if two-thirds of the nation's poor are white, why don't whites
constitute two-thirds of AFDC recipients?-is explained by at least one social scientist as attributable to the fact that white Americans are able to take advantage of
many more programs, including widows' survivor's benefits, that help them escape
poverty. Id. Cf Welfare: Publicationsof Interest, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1433 (Feb.
1993) (stating that although the number of poor is increasing more rapidly among
non-Hispanic whites than among blacks, "whites are more than twice as likely as
blacks and Hispanics to be lifted out of poverty by government safety net programs,"
citing IsAAc SHAimo, WrrE POvERTY IN AMERICA).
73. ADOLESCENT MOTHERs, supra note 11, at 44.
74. Id. In an average month in 1991, about 4.3 million families with 8.4 million
children and 3.9 million adult caretakers received AFDC benefits. Blong, supra note
51, at 1165.
Some sources blame the high incidence of poverty among women and children on
the failure to enforce orders to pay child support. Karen Levine, Report Backs Child
Support Bill, MASS. LAw. WKLy., Nov. 15, 1993, at 33; Rorie Sherman, IRS to Collect
From Dad?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13, 1993, at 1 ("[Iln 1989, the U.S. Bureau of the Census found that of those parents who had a court order for child support, only 26
percent actually received all the money due them. In addition.... about 10 million
parents with custody who theoretically were eligible to receive child support didn't
have court orders. The Census Bureau says potentially $19 billion is owed in child
support.").
75. HACKER, supra note 11, at 85. See also ADOLESCENT MoTmRs, supra note
11, at xvi, 45 (stating that among AFDC recipients, studies show that nearly threefourths of young AFDC mothers - those in their teens and twenties - left the
AFDC program within three years. Statistics for young mothers are especially im-

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 13:169

twenty-three months.76 Nearly two-thirds of recipients had been
enrolled for three years or less in 1990, and less than one-fourth
had been enrolled for five or more years. 77
Most AFDC families (about forty-three percent) have only one
child; thirty percent have two children.78 Thus, nearly threequarters of all AFDC families have no more than two children.
Only one in ten AFDC families has four children.79 The average
size of the welfare family was, as of 1990, 2.9 people,80 down from
four in 1969.81 Figuring at least one parent in each family, the average welfare family has no more than two children.82 The average
age of an AFDC child was seven and a half years in 1990.83 In New
Jersey, the average family size overall is 3.3, while the average
family size among poor families is 3.5.84
As for the idea that AFDC mothers are enjoying "successions
of sexual partners (so not only are they bankrupting society but
they are also having a fine time while decent people toil),"85 again,
the reality is quite different. A federally funded study conducted by
Harvard University found that from 1972 to 1984, the number of
children in black, female-headed households grew by twenty-five
percent overall, while the number of children in AFDC-supported
portant in the AFDC context because this group constitutes over half of the AFDC
recipient pool). Id. at 45; Blong, supra note 51, at 1166 ("Recent studies estimate
that half the families who start to receive AFDC will receive it for no more than two
years at a time and that half the families who ever receive AFDC receive it for no
more than four years over the course of their lives. As to long-term use, these studies estimate that 30 percent of those who ever receive AFDC will receive it for eight
or more years over the course of their lives.").
76. AFDC REcn'IENTS, supra note 63, at 1.

77. Id.
78. HACKER, supra note 11, at 87; Blong, supra note 51, at 1166.
79. Id. See also, New Jersey Hearings, supra note 7, at 26 (statement by Margaret Woods, Executive Director, Independence High School) (July 9, 1991) (noting
that the average AFDC family is a mother and two children and that only 5% or 6%
of all AFDC families have six or more children); Legislative Fiscal Estimate to Assembly Bill 4703 (Oct. 22, 1991) (noting that the legislature does not know the size of
the AFDC households in which births occur); ADOLESCENT MOTMERs, supra note 11,
at 44-45 (reporting that the average single-parent AFDC family-which constitutes
90% of AFDC households-comprised 2.8 members, with the two-parent AFDC-LUP
family averaging 4.4 people); MARK ROBERT RANY, LrIVING ON THE EDGE: THE REtALrrY
OF WELFAm IN AMERICA (1994) (stating that women on welfare have lower birth

rates than other women and that illegitimacy rates tend to be lowest in states with
the most generous welfare benefits, and highest in states with the most meager
benefits).
80. AFDC REcIPIENTS, supra note 63, at 1.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
HACKER, supra note 11, at 90; see infra note 87.
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black, female-headed households dropped by fifteen percent.8 6 Furthermore, according to government studies, AFDC enrollees, like
other people, base decisions about whether or not to bear a child on
a variety of complex "psychosocial" factors, including emotional immaturity and lack of self-esteem, the desire to have someone to love
who will return their love and depend upon them, and the wish to
escape a home plagued by economic deprivation or abusive circumstances.8 7 Experts also note that although economic incentives be they AFDC grants or income tax deductions - may not be the
reason anyone decides to parent an additional child, economic disincentives may well be the determining factor in the decision not to
keep a child.88

86. Kerr, supra note 67 (emphasis added); see also Laura Sydell, New Jersey
Takes ControversialRoute to Welfare Reform, National Public Radio, Morning Edition, Jan. 25, 1994 (noting that, according to Martha Davis, attorney with the NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund, research shows that women on public assistance
actually have lower birth rates than the general population).
87. New Jersey Hearings, supra note 7, at 51 (statement of Edward O'Connor,
Director of the National Assn. of Social Workers, New Jersey); WISCONSIN BRIEFS,
supra note 6, at 7; ADOLESCN'r MOTHERS, supra note 11, at 43.
Experts also note that no empirical evidence supports the notion that AFDC
recipients bear children in order to receive the additional grant. Adolescent
Mothers, supra note 11, at 43; Edelman, supra note 1, at 1701 n.16. See also Sydell,
supra note 86 (interviewing AFDC recipients, one of whom reported that additional
benefits or unwillingness to work have nothing to do with pregnancy, adding that
her pregnancies resulted from forced sexual intercourse with her then-boyfriend).
See also Lisa Brush, Welfare is a Family Issue, Too, Tex. Law., 27 (Aug. 29, 1994)
("We have no proof that capping benefits or requiring mothers to work for their welfare checks will reduce either the number or the poverty of single mothers and their
children."); Robert Samuelson,. . . Essential to the Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 8,
1993, at A19 ("In the mid-1980s, Leon Dash, a black reporter for The Post, spent
more than a year living in one of the city's poorest neighborhoods in an effort to
understand why unmarried teens had babies.... [H]e later wrote ... having 'a baby
is a tangible achievement in an otherwise dreary and empty future. It is one way of
announcing: I am a woman. For many boys. . ., the birth of a baby represents an
identical rite of passage.' . . . [Tihe choices are shaped by a sense of social isolation
and failure that may be hard, perhaps impossible, to change by government policy.
... The idea that girls have babies to get welfare checks is absurd."); Dorothy Roberts, Exploding the Myths Behind New Jersey Welfare Reform, N.J. L.J., 21 (Jan. 25,
1993) ("The act is based on two myths about women on welfare. First... the welfare
queen-the lazy mother on welfare who breeds children at the expense of the taxpayer in order to increase the amount of her welfare check.... In fact, numerous
studies have found no causal relationship between welfare and family size. Women
on welfare have lower fertility rates and on average give birth to no more children
than women off welfare.").
88. See ADOLESCENT MOTHERS, supra note 11, at 43 (reporting that 'Itihe evidence is less clear about whether the availability of welfare affects the pregnant woman's decisions" regarding abortion, adoption, or marriage).
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B. Other AFDC Legislation
AFDC has been the subject of many legislative proposals recently.S9 The Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law reported
"apparent" common trends in welfare legislation: "[in AFDC, benefit levels are reduced through cuts or freezes, and the welfare system is used to regulate not only employment, but also marriage,
childbirth, living arrangements, interstate migration, children's
school attendance, and other behavior of recipients."90 The Center
also noted "a continuing erosion of [AFDC] benefits" in 1992,91
which in some states came on top of cuts made in 1991.92 The
Center concluded, "[tihere is no indication that this is the last
round of cuts. Most analysts seem to expect states to continue to
experience severe budget problems. Moreover, states continue to
contemplate further cuts in public assistance." 93 These cuts come
in the face of a recommendation by the Congressional Budget Office
suggesting that, since these types of financial deprivations do not
effectively reduce the AFDC rolls, alternative means should be implemented, including increased welfare payments, increased educa94
tion and better economic opportunities.
Perhaps the greatest impetus behind AFDC legislation is conservation of resources (i.e., saving money).95 AFDC laws intended
to address this goal require AFDC applicants to assign to the state
any rights to receive child support payments; 96 require AFDC
mothers to cooperate with the state in determining the paternity of
nonmarital children; 9 7 implement mandatory income withholding;9 8 require the Internal Revenue Service to withhold income tax
refunds to persons in arrears on child support payments; 99 and implement expedited procedures for obtaining and enforcing child
support.100
89. See, e.g., New Welfare Cutbacks, supra note 14; Welfare Developments, supra

note 28 (discussing recent welfare legislation).
90. New Welfare Cutbacks, supra note 14, at 756.
91. Welfare Developments, supra note 28, at 1178.
92. Id. at 1179.
93. Id.
94. ADOLESCENT MOTHERs, supra note 11, at 43, 68-69.
95. New Welfare Cutbacks, supra note 14, at 757 (stating that "[tihe new welfare
cuts... were initiated by states, in apparent responses to recessionary pressures on
state budgets and heightened animus against 'welfare' and 'welfare recipients'.").
96. 42 U.S.C. § 602(aX26XA) (Supp. III 1982).
97. Id. § 602(aX26XB)(Supp. 111 1982).
98. Id. § 666(a)(1) (1988).
99. Id. § 664 (aX2)(A) (1988).
100. Id. § 666(aX5X1988); see Bowen v. Gilhiard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Anders,
supra note 3, at 584.
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In addition, AFDC legislation is used as a behavior modification tool.1o1 Legislation has been used in attempts to reduce the
number of births to AFDC families and to encourage AFDC recipients to seek employment.10 2 One type of AFDC legislation aimed at
the behavior of adult AFDC recipients is the "suitable homes" provision.1 0 3 First implemented in the 1950s,1 0 4 the "suitable homes"
laws denied benefits to homes containing children born out of wedlock.10 5 Successfully attacked in the 1960s,10 6 these laws have resurfaced today. 107
C. Challenges to AFDC Legislation
The U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed various legislative efforts in the AFDC arena.1 08 Generally the Court has upheld state
legislation under the rational basis standard of review,' 0 9 but on
occasion has sided with the challengers, striking down state AFDC
restrictions. l"0
101. Welfare Developments, supra note 28. Williams, supra note 4, at 1187-88;

Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 720 (1992); Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 29
(statement of Lawrence Mead, Associate Professor, American Public Welfare Politics, New York University) (discussing "The New Paternalism" and stating, "[iut is a
movement that goes beyond AFDC to embrace a number of other ways in which
public institutions have begun to try to govern the lives of the dependent."); Lurie,
supra note 9, at 829.
102. Williams, supra note 4, at 720; Lurie, supra note 9, at 829-34. In addition to
the so-called "family cap" legislation, states' efforts to reduce births among AFDC
recipients also include programs such as those that give AFDC mothers monetary
incentives to use Norplant, which have been proposed in Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Tennessee. Williams, supra note 4, at 720 n.4, 9.
Legislation aimed at encouraging AFDC parents to work includes the Work Incentive (WIN) program. Lurie, supra note 9, at 833, citing Dep't Health and Human
Services, Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 90-248, §§ 202(b), 444(a), (b), 81 Stat. 881,
884-9, 890 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(aX8), (19), 630-44 (1970)).
103. Lurie, supra note 9, at 831.
104. Id.; FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RicHARD A. CLwWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 13
(1971); JOHN KENNETH GALBRArrH, TE CuLTURE OF CONTENTMENT, 40-1 (1992).
105. Lurie, supra note 9, at 831.
106. Id.
107. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 29 (discussing "The New Paternalism");
Williams, supra note 4, at 720, 725.
108. See supra note 45; see infra notes 111-145 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1971) (invalidating a California provision that excluded parents on military duty from the definition of "continued absence" of a parent), infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text; Townsend v.
Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (striking an Illinois law that excluded from AFDC coverage children attending a college or university), infra notes 162-69 and accompanying
text.
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Judicial Interpretations of AFDC

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the focus of the
AFDC program is the child, with the purpose of the program being
primarily to preserve the child in a family environment. 1 1 ' Nevertheless, state legislatures have enacted various laws regulating
AFDC benefits and AFDC recipients,"X2 many of which have been
challenged on a number of different grounds.ll3
In Dandridge v. Williams,114 the goal of encouraging welfare
recipients to seek employment was proffered by the state and accepted by the Court.ll 5 The legislation in question set a maximum
6
grant allotment for AFDC recipients, which the Court upheld,11
giving the state considerable deference. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Douglas noted that the Court's acceptance of the state's argument - that a maximum cap on benefits would encourage employment - rested on the supposition that the AFDC recipients
were employable.11 7 Although the majority viewed the statute as
economic-social welfare legislation and accepted the state's assertions as rational,"18 Justice Douglas observed that limitations on
AFDC benefits "cannot reasonably operate as a work incentive with
regard to those who cannot work or who cannot be expected to
work."119
In Jefferson v. Hackney,120 the Court also rejected an Equal
Protection challenge to a state law restricting AFDC benefits,121
and the Court rejected a statutory argument based on the Social
Security Act. 12 2 The state law in question involved a percentage
system by which the Texas state welfare agency distributed funds
111. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 479 (1970).
112. See supra notes 3, 4, 14, 17, 102 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 20, at 1517-32 (discussing Equal Protection challenges brought in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), and Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); a Fourth Amendment challenge brought in Wyman v.

James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); and a Due Process Challenge brought in Bowen v. Gilhard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987)); Lurie, supra note 9, at 825.
114. 397 U.S. 471 (1970), reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970).
115. Id. at 490.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 490-508.
118. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 490.
119. Id.
120. 406 U.S. 535 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
121. Id. at 536; see also Lurie, supra note 9, at 845 (discussing the Court's
analysis).

122. Id. at 538. Specifically, appellants in Jefferson v. Hackney argued that the
state law in question violated § 602(aX23) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601,
et seq. Section 602(aX23) required each state to make cost-of-living adjustments to
the standard of need. Id. See also 42 U.S.C.S. § 602 (aX23) (1985).
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to welfare recipients.123 Because the Texas state constitution set a
ceiling on welfare spending,' 2 4 the state adopted a scheme by which
an eligible individual's needs were figured on a percentage basis so
that the state could guarantee at least some welfare assistance to
every eligible needy individual.125 Appellants in Hackney argued
that the scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because a different percentage was used for different welfare programs, with AFDC recipients subjected to a lower
"percentage reduction factor" than other welfare recipients, such as
individuals receiving Old Age Assistance,126 Aid to the Blind,127 or
Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled.128 The Court disagreed, stating that since a state may refuse to participate in the
AFDC program altogether while continuing to receive money for
other federal welfare programs, 12 9 a state participating in AFDC
may distribute benefits in a manner of its choosing so long as this
manner is rational and is not invidious.130 In regard to appellants'
assertion that the state scheme violated the Social Security Act,i13
the Court held that "although § 402(a)(23) required states to make
cost-of-living adjustments in their standard-of-need calculations, it
did not prohibit use of percentage-reduction systems that limited
the amount of welfare assistance actually paid."13 2 The Court also
held that although the Social Security Act was "intended to prevent
the states from denying benefits, even temporarily, to a person who
has been found fully qualified for aid[,]... [iut does not... enact by
implication a generalized federal criterion to which states must ad-

here in their computation of standards of need, income, and
benefits."1s
123. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 537.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. For individuals receiving Old Age Assistance, the percentage reduction
factor was 100%. Id. at 537 n.3.
127. Id. For individuals receiving Aid to the Blind, the percentage reduction factor was 95%. Id. at 537 n.3.
128. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 537, n.2. The percentage reduction factor for AFDC
recipients was 75%. For individuals receiving Aid for the Permanently and Totally
Disabled, the percentage reduction factor was 95%. Id. n.2-3.
129. Id. at 550.
130. Id.at 549.
131. The Act requires states to make cost-of-living adjustments in the AFDC program. The Texas method of distributing welfare benefits did not enable AFDC recipients to receive a level of benefits equal to their standard of need. Id. at 539.
132. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 538, (citing the Court's then-recent holding in Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970)); see also Lurie, supra note 9, at 842.
133. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 545.
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In Wyman v. James,134 an AFDC recipient challenged New
York's practice of requiring home visits by state case workers as a
condition for receiving AFDC benefits.'35 The plaintiff argued that
this practice violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches of her home. 136 The Court held that the visit
was not a "search," and, even if it were, it was not
"unreasonable."'137
The Supreme Court also disagreed with the plaintiffs' arguments in Bowen v. Gilliard.138 There plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of AFDC amendments resulting from the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984139 (DEFRA). The DEFRA amendments required that all income of all parents and siblings in a household be
counted in calculating AFDC benefits for the family.x4 0 Plaintiffs
argued that the amendments violated their Fifth Amendment due
process rights to family integrity and to compensation for property
taken by the government.14x The Court said the right to family integrity was not burdened because the DEFRA amendments did not
"directly and substantially" interfere with family living arrangements 142 and AFDC recipients have no protected property rights to
welfare benefits. 143
On the other hand, the Court has held that AFDC benefits are
an entitlement, not a privilege, and thus cannot be withheld for arbitrary reasons.144 Additionally, the Court has acknowledged that
AFDC grants are necessary for the subsistence of many families. 145
134. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
135. Id. at 313-15.

136. Id.
137. Id. at 318.
138. 483 U.S. 587 (1987); see also Note, Aid to Familieswith Dependent Children,
101 HARV. L. REv. 119, 270 (1987) [hereinafter Aid to Families with Dependent Children](discussing recent Supreme Court cases relating to AFDC); A.W. Phinney III,

Feminism, Epistemology, and the Rhetoric of Law: Reading Bowen v. Gilliard, 12
HASv. WoMEN's L.J. 151, 152 (1989) (analyzing the Court's decision in Bowen, stating that it "increase[s] the hardships of families on welfare by sanctioning State appropriation and redistribution of child support payments ...
139. Pub. Law No. 98-369, § 2640(a).
140. Ross, supra note 20, at 1528 (citing Bowen, 483 U.S. at 591).
141. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 595. The due process challenge was based on the family's
fundamental right to live together. Id. at 596. The takings clause challenge asserted that the AFDC benefit was property due the child, which the government
could not withdraw absent compensation. Id. at 595-96.
142. Id. at 603 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87, n.12 (1978)).
143. Id. at 604-05.
144. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1969). This view was reaffirmed in
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1978).
145. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264; Westcott, 443 U.S. at 85.
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Social Security Act146 Challenges

The U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed many Social Securitybased challenges to state AFDC legislation.147 These challenges
are founded in the Act's requirement that if states wish to participate in the AFDC program, they must administer the AFDC program in conformity with federal regulations.148 Those state laws
that conflict with federal regulations governing AFDC have been
stricken as violative of the Social Security Act and the Supremacy
Clause.149

In Carleson v. Remillard,150 the Supreme Court invalidated
California's failure to define parents on military duty as "continually absent."151 The definition was important because it set the2
standard for who would be allowed to receive AFDC benefits.15
The Social Security Act provided for monetary assistance to families with dependent children,1 53 defining "dependent child" as "one
'who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of...
continued absence from the home.'"154 The California legislature
interpreted "continued absence" as not including parents who were
away because of military duty.15 5 The Court struck down the California law, stating, "[w]e cannot assume here .

.

. that while Con-

gress 'intended to provide programs for the economic security and
protection of all children,' it also 'intended arbitrarily to leave one
class of destitute children entirely without meaningful protection.' "156 The Court continued, "[wie are especially confident Congress could not have designed an Act leaving uncared for an entire
class who became 'needy children' because their fathers were in the
Armed Services defending their country."'157
146. 42 U.S.C. § 301-1394; see supra note 18-27 and accompanying text.

147. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1971); Townsend v. Swank,
404 U.S. 282 (1971); Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).
148. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1971) (striking California
AFDC law excluding from coverage families in which a parent was absent due to
military service); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 482 (1971) (invalidating an Illinois
provision that denied AFDC benefits to children enrolled in college); Hackney, 406
U.S. 535 (upholding a Texas scheme under which AFDC benefits were reduced more
than other SSA benefits).
150. 406 U.S. 598 (1971).
151. Id. at 604.
152. Id. at 599.
153. Id.
154. Id., quoting 42 U.S.C. § 606(a).
155. Carleson,406 U.S. at 599.
156. Id. at 604 (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 330 (1968)).
157. Id.
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Under King v. Smith,158 the Court explained that state eligibility standards excluding those who would be eligible under federal standards violate the Social Security Act and, therefore, are
invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 159 The Court also noted that
in Townsend v. Swank,160 it "expressly disapproved" policies enabling states to vary eligibility requirements from federal standards without express or clearly implied congressional
authorization. 161
In Townsend v. Swank,162 the Court invalidated a state statute that conflicted with the Social Security Act.163 Townsend involved an Illinois provision denying AFDC benefits to children
64
eighteen to twenty years old attending a college or university,1
even though children of the same age attending high school or vocational training were eligible for AFDC benefits.165 Noting that federal regulations "seem to imply that states may to some extent vary
eligibility requirements from federal standards,"16 6 the Court reiterated its holding in King that "the principle that accords substantial weight to interpretation of a statute by the department
entrusted with its administration is inapplicable insofar as those
regulations are inconsistent with the requirement of § 402(a)(10)
that aid be furnished 'to all eligible individuals.' "167 The Court
said no evidence supported the state's assertion that Congress authorized the states to "discriminate between these needy dependent
children solely upon the basis of the type of school attended."165 Finally, the Court wrote, "a State's interest in preserving the fiscal
158. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
159. Carleson, 406 U.S. at 600 (citing Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286
(1971)).
160. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
161. Carleson, 406 U.S. at 600-01. The Court also noted that, in King, it had
recognized this "congressional authorization" exception. Id. at 600 (citing Townsend
404 U.S. at 286).
162. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
163. Id. at 285.
164. Id. at 284.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 286, citing 45 CFR § 233.10(a)(lXii), 36 Fed. Reg. 3866, which states:
[tihe groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the eligibility conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or
unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment of individuals or groups in the light of the provisions and purposes of the
public assistance titles of the Social Security Act.
Townsend, 404 U.S. at 286, n.3.
167. Id. (quoting King, 392 U.S. at 333 n.34).
168. Id. at 287. The Court did not recognize, however, that when Congress extended AFDC eligibility from children under 16 to children aged 18 to 20 years old,
States were given the authorization to decide whether to participate in the AFDC
program for the older age groups. Id. at 287-88.
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integrity of its welfare program by economically allocating limited
AFDC resources may not be protected by the device of adopting eli-

gibility requirements restricting the class of children made eligible
by federal standards."169
Appellants in Jefferson v. Hackney170 also asserted that the
state scheme violated the Social Security Act. The Act requires
states to make cost-of-living adjustments in the AFDC program, but
the Texas method of distributing benefits did not enable AFDC recipients to obtain a level of benefits equal to their standard of
need.171 As previously mentioned,172 the Court disagreed and upheld the legislation. 173

The Supreme Court has also ruled that states may not punish
children for the "sins" of their parents.1 74 In King v. Smith,175 the
Supreme Court struck down Alabama's "substitute father" rule because it punished children rather than dealing with the perceived
immorality -

the mother's cohabitation with her boyfriend -

via

rehabilitative measures, as mandated by Congress.176 In King, the
state sought to deny benefits to children whose mothers were "cohabiting" with a man. The Court concluded that the state's punishment of needy children for their mothers' behavior conflicted with
Congress' intent to effect behavioral changes among AFDC parents.' 7 7 Noting that "protection of such [dependent] children is the
paramount goal of AFDC,"178 the Court invalidated the
legislation.179
169. Id. at 291.
170. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
171. Id. at 539-40. The state law involved a percentage system by which the state
welfare agency distributed funds. Id. at 537. Because the Texas state constitution
set a ceiling on welfare spending, the state adopted a scheme by which an eligible
individual's needs were figured on a percentage basis so that the state could guarantee at least some welfare assistance to every eligible needy individual. Id. See supra
note 145 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 120-133 and accompanying text.
173. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 544-45.
174. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325-27.

175. Id.

176. King, 392 U.S. at 325; Lurie, supra note 9, at 832. See also Boettger v.
Bowen, 714 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding suspension of benefits improper

because conduct in question was outside the bounds of the AFDC program).
177. The Court discussed Congress' adoption of the Flemming Ruling-a letter
from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare issued in response to Louisiana legislation allowing children in "unsuitable" homes to be dropped from the
AFDC rolls. King, 392 U.S. at 322-23 (citing State Letter No. 452, Bureau of Public
Assistance, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare. The Court reasoned that Congress had "determined that immorality and
illegitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than measures that punish dependent children[.]"). Id. at 325.
178. Id. at 325.
179. Id. at 333.
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Equal Protection8O Challenges

AFDC laws also have been challenged on equal protection
grounds.' 8 ' The Constitution guarantees equal protection under
the laws to all citizens.18 2 Equal protection means that government -

both State and Federall8

-

may not deny a person or

class of persons the same protection of the laws guaranteed to or
84
enjoyed by other similarly situated persons or classes of persons.1
This protection covers all governmental actions that base "benefits
or burdens" on the classification of individuals.185 Some authorities
assert that equal protection analysis is of negligible use in launching successful challenges in modern day federal courts,' 8 6 while
87
others believe the doctrine may still be useful.1
Equal protection was used to attack the state's percentage system of distributing welfare funds in Jefferson v. Hackney. 188 Appellants argued that the scheme violated the Equal Protection
180. See infra notes 181-84. See also Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (holding that

the state scheme in question did not violate the Equal Protection Clause since the
Court could not say that differential treatment was invidious or irrational);
Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a New York law that capped the
maximum level of AFDC benefits a family could receive).
181. See Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that otherwise
qualified citizens and alien children may not be denied benefits because their parents are illegal aliens); Largo v. Sunn, 835 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding differentials in benefits where standard of need varies among families of same
composition); Guidice v. Jackson, 726 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.Va. 1989) (holding that equitable treatment is required in "fairly general terms" only); see also note 180 and
accompanying text.
182. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
183. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection guarantee directly applies
only to states and local governments, but the Equal Protection guarantee has been
applied to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment in Supreme Court
cases. See Lyng v. Castillo 477 U.S. 635, 636, n. 1 (1986) (citing Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976)); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 533, n.5 (1972); and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
184. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 541 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
185. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrrUTrIONAL LAW, § 14.1 (4th ed.
1991).
186. Barbara Sard, The Role of Courts in Welfare Reform, CLEARINGHOUSE REV.,
367, 375 (Aug./Sept. 1988).
187. See, Aid to Families With Dependent Children, supra note 138, at 279-80
(noting that in Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987), one reason the Court may
have declined to decide the case using heightened scrutiny under equal protection is
that the case was brought by the children, not the parents, and arguing that had the
non-custodial parents been parties to the case, infringement on the parent-child relationship may have been recognized and higher scrutiny implemented); Anders,
supra note 3, at 590-97; Phinney, supra note 138, at 168-70; Sard, supra note 186, at
374-75.
188. 406 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1972). See also supra notes 180-81 and accompanying
text.
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ClauselB9 because AFDC recipients were subjected to a lower "percentage reduction factor"190 than other welfare recipients.i 9 ' The
Court disagreed. Because a state may refuse to participate in the
AFDC program altogether while continuing to receive money for
other federal welfare programs,1 92 a state may distribute benefits
in the manner of its choosing so long as it seems rational and is not
invidious. 193

In Dandridge v. Williams,194 the Supreme Court upheld a
Maryland law that capped the maximum benefits a family could receive under that state's AFDC program.' 9 5 Set at a level equal to
the income one person would make, working full-time and earning
minimum wage, the cap kicked in once the family reached six persons. 196 The Court reasoned that encouraging AFDC recipients to
seek employment was a valid state interest and the law did not vio97
late equal protection since the cap applied to all AFDC families.'
In King v. Smith,198 the Court held that the state legislation

in question was not a rational means by which to pursue the state's
dual interests of conserving scarce AFDC resources and discouraging "immoral" behavior. The Court noted that, in addition to
"senselessly punish[ing] impoverished children," actions such as
those the state proposed had forced women into increased immorality in an effort to provide for their children, and had been used to
"disguise systematic racial discrimination[.]'1 99 Thus, the Court
stated, although states may have a reasonable interest in discouraging immorality and illegitimacy, those interests are not legitimate justifications for excluding2 00otherwise eligible dependent
children from the AFDC program.
Equal protection analysis has also been used to attack laws
presented as measures by which to confront other problems, but im189. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 538.
190. Id. at 537.
191. Id. at 537-38. The percentage reduction factor for AFDC recipients was 75%.
For individuals receiving Old Age Assistance, the percentage reduction factor was
100%; for Aid to the Blind, 95%; and for Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 95%. Id. at 537 n.3.
192. Id. at 550.
193. Id. at 549.
194. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
195. Id. at 480-83.
196. Id. at 490 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 486-87.
198. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). Although the case was decided on statutory grounds,
the Court engaged in lengthy Equal Protection analysis.
199. Id. at 321-22.
200. Id. at 334.
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plemented primarily to effect social change.201 Generally, if social
welfare legislation classifies similarly situated individuals and
treats those classes differently in order to achieve the government's
ends, while not affecting a suspect class202 or impinging on a fundamental right,2 03 the classification need only bear some rational relationship to legitimate government goals.204 This type of analysis
- minimal scrutiny or rational basis review - has characterized
most of the Court's decisions in social welfare cases. 2 05 On occasion, the Court has used minimal scrutiny "with bite," invalidating
social welfare legislation because the means were not rationally re206
lated to the ends.
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,207 the Court invalidated
a zoning ordinance that prohibited the establishment of a home for
mentally retarded individuals in a residential neighborhood.208 Reviewing all of the asserted state goals, only some of which the Court
recognized as potentially legitimate,209 the Court concluded that
the classification was based on irrational prejudices against the
mentally retarded, and so could not rationally support the state interests. 21 0 The interests in Cleburne included concerns that neighboring residents would harbor "negative attitudes" toward or be
fearful of the residents; fears that students from a nearby junior
high might harass the residents; that the home was located on a
five-hundred-year flood plain; and, concern that the size of the
21 1
home and the number of occupants would be too great.
201. Such laws include the zoning ordinance at issue in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
202. Suspect classes are defined as those based on race or alienage; semi-suspect
classes include illegitimacy and gender. See NowAK, supra note 185, § 14.3.
203. Id.
204. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19,23 (1988); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635,639;
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 40 (1972).
205. Ross, supra note 20, at 1516; see, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. at 642-43
(stating that "Congress could reasonably determine," "might well have" been con-

vinced, "might have reasoned," or "could rationally conclude" that the legislation in
question would serve the state goals). For examples of laws that were struck down
because the means could not conceivably promote the state's interests, see Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (invalidating a regulation that the Court said in no way
served the state's interest of inducing people to move to that state, when newcomers
were not rewarded, but long-time residents were). See also King, 329 U.S. at 333-34;
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 27; Phinney supra note 138, at 166, 168-70.
206. See Cleburne, 437 U.S. at 446; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-36.
207. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
208. Cleburne, 437 U.S. at 450.
209. See infra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing the goals proffered and
the Court's holding).
210. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.

211. Id., at 448-49.
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The Court indicated that while the city council's potential concerns regarding the flood plain and the size of the house and
number of occupants could be considered legitimate,212 the city
council's actual concerns regarding the location of the home on a
flood plain, the size of the home and the number of occupants could
not pass the Court's rationality review because the city council allowed boarding and fraternity houses, nursing homes, and hospitals to be located in the area.2 13 The Court saw no rational basis
for prohibiting the location of a home for the mentally retarded
2 14
while allowing the other uses.
In Dep't. of Agric. v. Moreno,215 the Court held that the legis-

lature may not enact laws merely to thrust majoritarian ideals onto
a politically unpopular group. 2 16 Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, stated that government may not accomplish even a legitimate goal by establishing "'invidious distinctions between classes
of its citizens.'"217 In Moreno, the legislative record included a
statement that the legislature sought to prevent "hippie communes" from participating in the food stamp program. 2 18 The
Court held this to be violative of the constitutional guarantee to
equal protection, noting that the "purpose to discriminate against
hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to (some independent) considerations in the public interest, justify the ...
amendment." 219 The state offered another goal - prevention of
fraud - which the Court accepted as legitimate. 22 0 However, the
Court said the classification - the denial of "essential federal food
assistance to all otherwise eligible households containing unrelated
members" - could not constitute a rational means by which to
achieve that goal.221 (The Court's holding was also based in part on
the fact that the state's only legitimate goal - fraud prevention 22 2
was already being addressed.)
Under rational basis review in the equal protection arena, the
means chosen do not necessarily have to be the most reasonable, so
long as the classification established by the state is not "wholly ar212. Id. at 449-50.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 450.
215. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
216. Id. at 537-38.
217. Id. at 543 (Douglas, J. concurringXquoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, at 833 (1969)).
218. Id. at 534.
219. Id. (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.ll (1972)).
220. Id. at 535.
221. Id. at 535-36.

222. Id. at 537.
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bitrary,"223 or "wholly without any rational basis."224 Even where
the legislation will result in unfairness or deprivation, the Court
has upheld laws promoting legitimate ends and supported by rationally related means. 22 5 However, the Court has held that the
classification must not have been established merely to deny a benefit to a group disfavored by the legislature.226
Thus, if the classification does not infringe on a fundamental
right nor implicate a suspect class, but rather has distinguishing
characteristics that are relevant to interests that the state has authority to implement, the courts will defer to the legislature and the
classification will be upheld.227
AFDC regulations are mandatory, as opposed to permissive, so
that legislation eliminating the per-child allotment must support
the goals of the AFDC program. 2 28 The goals of AFDC are to provide funds that will be used in the child's best interests, as well as
to encourage the care of the child in his home and "to help maintain
and strengthen family life."229 It is within this framework that the
New Jersey statute eliminating the per-child allotment should be
analyzed.
D. New Jersey Legislation EliminatingAFDC Per-Child
Allotment
The New Jersey law became effective in July 1992. The statute23 0 reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Human Services shall revise the schedule
of benefits to be paid to [an AFDC family] ... by eliminating the

increment in benefits under the program for which that family
would otherwise be eligible as a result of the birth of a child

The New Jersey legislative record expressly states that the
legislation is intended to discourage AFDC recipients from parenting additional children:
223. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 27 (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303-04 (1976)).
224. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 639 n.3, (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538).
225. Phinney, supra note 138, at 170 (noting that the Court admits that legislation may result in "'arbitrary consequences,' 'inequality,' 'illogical' accommodations,
and 'discrimination,'" (quoting Bowen v. Gihiard, 483 U.S. at 3016-17)).
226. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (holding a zoning ordinance invalid because the
Court viewed the legislation as based on "irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded").
227. Id. at 441-42.
228. See, e.g., King, 392 U.S. at 312, n.3.
229. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 601, 605 (1985) (emphasis added).
230. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (1993). See also supra note 4.
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The measure seeks to discourage AFDC recipients from having
additional children while enrolled on public assistance and encourages recipients to be self-sufficient and earn the funds 2necessary to sustain the family through gainful employment. 31
One of the most common reasons cited as motivating this type
of legislation is simple bias.232 Proponents of welfare reform assert

that welfare programs have caused increased unemployment and
out-of-wedlock births.233 Critics counter that we simply favor the
"deserving" poor -

widows -

wed mothers234 -

and that we favor social security over wel-

over the "undeserving" poor -

un-

fare. 2 3 5 Some welfare reformers cite a growing dependency on the

part of welfare recipients and say that welfare reform represents a
return to "mutual obligation" between the state and the welfare recipients. 2 36 It is this debate that has given rise to the New Jersey
legislation.23 7
New Jersey legislators cite two reasons behind the legislation:
saving money and modifying behavior.238 The latter goal is aimed
at reducing the number of out-of-wedlock births and teen
pregnancies among AFDC recipients, and at encouraging AFDC recipients to seek employment. 23 9
231. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 76.
232. See supra note 11.

233. JENCKS, supra note 20, at 11; Edelman, supra note 1, at 1722 n.149 ("Conservatives argue that spending on the poor has increased significantly and yet poverty has worsened, 'proving' their point that antipoverty programs do not work.").
In response to assertions that welfare has hurt the poor, Jencks offers evidence
that such assertions are not true and an explanation for why such assertions persist-convenience. JENCKS, supra note 20, at 15. Edelman's response to assertions
that increased spending on the poor has only worsened the problem of poverty is, "...
what has increased so substantially is spending on the elderly, hospitals, and doctors, not spending that enhances the income of the nonelderly poor." Edelman,
supra note 1, at 1722 n.149. For additional discussions regarding assertions that the
Great Society has failed, see id. at 1712-13. For a discussion of structural poverty vs.
pathological poverty, see id. at 1700.
234. See supra note 20.
235. Id. See supra note 11; Rulemaking, 117 N.J. at 317.
236. Nancy Weaver, Second Try for Trims in Welfare, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 9,

1993, at A20 (quoting Russell Gould, California's Secretary of Health and Welfare;
and, reporting that the state's most recent attempts at welfare reform are in the
wake of increased unemployment).
237. Sydell, supra note 86.
238. Supra notes 7, 10, 230 and accompanying text. Legislation in the welfare
arena has long been perceived as a way to modify behavior. Lurie, supra note 9, at
829 ("AFDC payments inherently provide an incentive for the poor to alter their
behavior-to migrate, withdraw from the labor force, desert their families, and have
children.").
The author notes that any increases in welfare dependency could be blamed as
much on government as on the behavior of the poor. Id. at 857.
239. Id.; WiscoNsnm BRIEFS, supra note 6.
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It does appear that by withholding funds from children born
into AFDC families, the state of New Jersey could save $64 for
every child born to an AFDC recipient. 2 40 However, any savings at
the state level may be more than offset by the increased expenditures at the federal level since, as AFDC payments decrease, federally funded food stamp allowances increase. 2 4 1 In addition, any
savings in the state AFDC budget likely will be offset by increased
expenditures in other areas, such as child welfare, foster care, and
healthcare if, as some suggest, the legislation gives rise to increased
instances of child neglect, increases in the number of children en2
tering foster care, and increased numbers of abortions. 42
In regard to the goal of encouraging AFDC recipients to seek
employment, proponents assert that AFDC parents will be motivated to seek employment if an additional AFDC grant is not provided for a newborn; 24 3 they do not explain why elimination of the
per-child allotment will provide that motivation if other pro-em244
ployment measures already in place apparently do not.

Proponents of the measure also insist that the elimination of
the per-child allotment is a reasonable measure because, they say,
AFDC recipients bear children in order to receive the additional
grant.245 Supporters of the legislation claim that, since working
families do not receive additional pay from employers when a child
is born, AFDC recipients should not receive additional aid from the
6
government. 24
Critics argue that the legislation is based on biased stereotypes 24 7 and that there is no basis in fact for assuming that AFDC

recipients are influenced to parent children because of the additional grant.248 Critics also argue that the legislation will achieve
none of the goals named by proponents, but instead will merely
force the moral ideals of those in power onto the relatively power240. Senate Hearings,supra note 8, at 12.
241. Id.
242. Infra notes 252-56; Academics Challenge Claim That Welfare Subsidizes Illegitimacy, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 6 (June 24, 1994) ("The 76 social scientists.., said

more children would be hungry and homeless under proposals pushed by the right to
discourage illegitimacy by denying welfare to young unwed mothers.").
243. Id.
244. See supra note 11.
245. Sydell, supra note 86.
246. Id.; Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 6. These individuals ignore the fact
that working people receive a dependency exemption upon the addition of any dependent-child or adult-to the family. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, §§ 151, 152.
The amount of the dependency exemption is $2,000 per child or dependent. Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, § 151 (M.
247. See supra note 11.
248. Id.
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less AFDC recipients and punish the children born into AFDC families.249 Critics predict that such legislation will result in increased

homelessness; 2 50 an increase in the number of children not properly housed, clothed, and fed;251 forced adoptions or foster care 2 5 2
since families will not be able to stretch the already inadequate
AFDC funds;253 and increased abortions.254
States currently considering per-child allotment legislation include Wisconsin, 2 55 Georgia, Arkansas, California, Maryland, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Virginia.256
Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, Maine, and South Carolina appear to
have considered such legislation but have either postponed a vote
on the issue or have dropped the idea altogether.257
H. Analysis
A.

Overview

Legislation eliminating the AFDC per-child allotment is of importance for several reasons, chief among them the fact that AFDC
legislation directly affects approximately nine million children
across the United States. 258 Presumably, these children will one
day be adults. 2 59 Whether or not these children will become productive adults depends largely on whether opportunities are available to them today.260 If we deny these children the opportunity to
live in a healthy environment, we deny them the opportunity to
learn and grow, and to become productive adults. 26 1 In purely economic terms, it is much more efficient to expend a little money to249. WISCONSIN BRIEFS, supra note 6, at 7; New Jersey Hearings,supra note 7, at
38, 39; Sydell, supra note 86.
250. Id.
251. Id.; WISCONSIN BRIEFS, supra note 6, at 7.
252. WISCONSIN BRIEFS, supra note 6, at 7; MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, FocusUnfair Change?Apr. 13, 1992, (comments of Theresa Funicello, co-director of Social
Agenda); United Press International, Sullivan Rejects Welfare-Abortion Suggestion,
Apr. 12, 1992.

253. See supra note 33 (noting that the AFDC benefit was below the poverty level
in every state).
254. WISCONSIN BRIEFS, supra note 6, at 7; MacNeiVLehrer NewsHour, supra
note 252; United Press International, supra note 252.
255. See supra note 4 (describing the Wisconsin pilot program).
256. Id. See supra notes 4, 14, 17.
257. Id.
258. ADOLESCENT MoTHERs, supra note 11, at 44.
259. Mortality rates for American children in poverty rival the mortality rates for
children living in some Third World countries. Jeff Cohen, Compassionfor Children
Gets Lost in Big Numbers, SEATrLE TiEs, Jan. 29, 1994, All.
260. WILLIA

JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 14 (1987).

261. Id. at 39-41
higher education).

(discussing

the lack of opportunities for individuals without
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day in an effort to offer these children the opportunity to become
productive adults than to deny that funding and that opportunity
and, as a result, expend much larger sums to support those unproductive adults. Curiously, for the most part, this issue has not been
on the national forefront, unlike topics such as abortion and health
care reform.262 Perhaps the reason is that the poor in general have
been segregated from the rest of society. 26 3 Thus we find it nearly
impossible to identify with the poor and, therefore, easy to believe
the myths and stereotypes about them. 2 64 The resulting biases
lead to legislation that penalizes people for circumstances largely
beyond their control.265
Common perceptions regarding AFDC families are incorrect.
Many Americans believe that the poor are motivated by different
factors than the rest of society, whether the motivation in question
focuses on incentives to work or decisions to bear children.26 6 The
267
New Jersey legislation is based on these misperceptions.
The legislative history shows that the New Jersey legislation
was intended to serve as an incentive to seek employment, 268 as
well as a disincentive to bear children while enrolled in AFDC.269
2
The legislation is also designed as a means to save money. 70
These ideas ignore the sociological as well as the economic realities
of the average AFDC family.271 To believe that reducing welfare
grants will result in a rush to the employment office - and a paying job - is unrealistic at best and very possibly mortally harmful
to the children of AFDC families.272 And, to rely on such legislation
262. Senate Hearings,supra note 8, at 6 (statement by Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan)
(noting that, "When we talk about children, the number of people who turn up is
rare."); (statement by Sen. Bill Bradley) (adding that the "normal circumstance of a
welfare hearing [is] about ten people in the room."). Id.
Although welfare ordinarily doesn't make headline news as often as many other
issues, such as abortion and health care reform, the topic has received a good deal of
media attention since President Clinton unveiled his welfare reform proposals in
mid-1994 and Congress created its "Contract with America." LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Current News file.
263. Elsa Brenner, After a Suit, Moving to a New Life, N.Y. TmImEs, Nov. 7, 1993,
13WC, 1; Sharon Bass, Public Housing Enters New Era, N.Y. Tnoms, Feb. 5, 1989,

12CN, 1.
264. See supra notes 11, 20 (discussing various beliefs regarding the poor).
265. Williams, supra note 4, at 719 n.2.
266. See supra notes 11, 20, 48.
267. Id.
268. See supra notes 7, 10.
269. See supra notes 7, 10, 231.
270. Id.
271. Sydell, supra note 86.
272. See supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood
that elimination of the per-child allotment will result in increased abortion, or harm
to the children).
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as a money saver is, in essence, to "balance the budget on the backs
of the poor."273 In addition to being irrational,274 the per-child al-

lotment legislation is a cruel way in which to save those few dollars
that might possibly be saved.275
Because children are the focus of the AFDC program, 27 6 and
constitute two-thirds of the eleven million people receiving AFDC
benefits, 2 77 and because elimination of the per-child allotment gives
rise to serious concerns regarding the potential effects on children,2 78 the proper perspective from which to view the conse-

quences of the legislation is the child's vantage point. 2 79 Judicial
review at the highest federal level is warranted because great potential exists for harm to children of AFDC families, 28 0 because
self-policing of federal agencies cannot always be relied upon in
matters of such great importance 28 ' and because federal courts reportedly have been quite inconsistent in their handling of cases involving administrative regulations. 28 2 Legislation regarding social
welfare, however, will most likely receive only rational basis scrutiny, unless the legislation on its face affects a fundamental right or
3
implicates a suspect or semi-suspect class.28
273. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 29. See also Kathy Barrett Carter, Welfare
Fix: Punitive Paradigmfor Paring Poor, 135 N.J. L.J. 1503 (1993) (comparing the

per-child allotment legislation to similar measures that could be directed at the middle-class, such as states deciding to educate only one child per family, or laws forcing
only people with children to fund schools. "These ideas surely would not gain much
momentum because educating the young is not viewed as simply a parental responsibility, but as a societal one. Similarly, providing food, shelter and other basic
needs to children, who are unfortunate enough to be born poor, should be considered
the duty of society at large.").
274. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (reporting that as AFDC benefits
are reduced at the state level, food stamp benefits are increased at the federal level).
275. See supra note 11 (revealing that legislators do not know whether the measure will actually save money); Carter, supra note 273 (stating- "[aire the alleged
savings really a savings? If these children are forced to live in substandard conditions with inadequate food, housing and clothing, won't we all pay later? When they
enter school suffering from malnutrition, when they are forced into special education
classes because they have lived their formative years in an environment where it is
nearly impossible to thrive, when they show up in hospital emergency rooms sick,
when they end up homeless because their mothers used rent money to pay for food or
clothing, ultimately taxpayers pay.").
276. See supra notes 26-27.
277. ADoLEscENTr MoTHERs, supra note 11, at 44.

278. See supra note 272.
279. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 479.
280. See supra note 25 (discussing the potential dangers of allowing implementation of social welfare "pilot programs" through waivers).
281. Hubbard, supra note 46, at 14.
282. Id. at 15-16.
283. Supra note 202.
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Social Security Act

Since AFDC was established under the federal Social Security
28
Act,284 AFDC legislation must conform with federal regulations. 5
Those state laws in conflict with federal regulations governing
AFDC are violative of the Social Security Act and the Supremacy
Clause.28 6 The New Jersey legislation eliminating the per-child allotment is analogous to those laws discussed in Carleson v. Remillard287 and Townsend v. Swank.288 Just as the law at issue in
Carleson was overturned because the state's interpretation of "continued absence" directly conflicted with Congress' intent, 28 9 the
per-child allotment law should be overturned because New Jersey's
withholding of benefits to some children precludes fulfillment of a
paramount AFDC goal - maintaining and protecting children.
Likewise, as in Townsend, where the law arbitrarily denied benefits
to college-enrolled 18- to 20-year-olds,29o the per-child allotment
law arbitrarily denies benefits to some children in AFDC families
but not others. 29 1 Furthermore, the New Jersey law merely punishes children for the "sins" of their parents. 2 9 2 As the Court noted
in King, 2 93 such laws violate the very purpose of AFDC - protect2 94
ing dependent children.
The New Jersey per-child allotment law is distinguishable
from the law discussed in Jefferson v. Hackney.295 There, the law
allowed a differential to be applied to various welfare programs, but
2 96
called for figuring all AFDC benefits using a lower percentage.
The Court upheld the measure, since the percentage used was the
same among all AFDC recipients, and since the scheme allowed the
state to provide benefits to all needy individuals. 29 7 However, the
New Jersey per-child allotment law does not provide the same measure, or ratio, of benefits to all needy individuals: some children are
completely left out of the equation and are not covered by the program simply because of the timing of their birth.298 This is in di284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 45 and 110.
406 U.S. 598 (1971).
404 U.S. 282 (1971).
Id.
See supra notes 162-65.
See supra notes 167-69.
Sydell, supra note 86.
392 U.S. 309.
Id. at 325 ("protection of such children is the paramount goal of AFDC.").
406 U.S. 535. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
Id.

298. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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rect conflict with AFDC's purpose of protecting and maintaining
dependent children.
Like the laws in Carleson and Townsend, the New Jersey perchild allotment law should be invalidated as a violation of the Social
Security Act.
C.

Equal Protection

The New Jersey legislation divides similarly situated people
- children of poor families - into two classifications: children who
are allotted AFDC benefits and children who are not. An argument
could be made that the classes are not similarly situated at all: one
family is receiving AFDC funds when its child is born and thus is
subject to the state's regulations and restrictions, while the other
family is not receiving AFDC benefits when its child is born and so
is not burdened by the state's regulations. However, this argument
looks at the situation from the perspective of the parents. Because
AFDC is intended first and foremost to help children, and because
benefits are calculated according to the number of dependent children, it is from the child's perspective that the legislation should be
29 9
viewed.
By eliminating the per-child allotment for children born to
families enrolled in the AFDC program, New Jersey is further classifying children into two groups: those born prior to enrollment, and
those born subsequent to enrollment. Only the former will be ac300
That is, "as
counted for in the figuring of benefits for the family.
[families] come into the system ... there is no limit on the number
"301
of children. You can come in with two, five, ten, fifteen ...
However, if an AFDC family with one child subsequently has a second child, regardless of the circumstances under which the child is
conceived, 3 02 the family will not receive benefits for the
3
newborn. 30
This legislation creates two classes of children - those who
will be considered in the grant allotment for the family, and those
who will not. The classification is based solely on when the child is
born. Because the two groups are similarly situated - both are
299. King, 392 U.S. at 325 ("protection of such children is the paramount goal of

AFDC.").
300. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (1993).
301. New Jersey Hearings, supra note 7, at 4.
302. See, e.g., New Jersey Hearings, supra note 7, at 31-33 (July 9, 1991) (statement of May Daniels, Ed.D.) (noting that even the most diligent use of birth control
is not always effective).
303. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (1993).

204

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 13:169

needy, dependent children - but differently treated, the law is subject to equal protection analysis.3 04
1.

Analysis of Ends -

Legitimate?

The first inquiry under Equal Protection analysis asks
whether the ends are legitimate. Statutes that eliminate the perchild allotment are said to promote the goals of first saving money;
second, encouraging AFDC recipients to seek employment; and,
third, removing the purported monetary incentive for AFDC families to bear children.305
In King v. Smith,306 the U.S. Supreme Court firmly embraced
fiscal conservation - particularly as concerns the AFDC program
as a solidly legitimate goal.307 The Court reiterated its stance
on money-saving as a legitimate goal in Shapiro v. Thompson.308
Likewise, the Court has embraced the goal of encouraging welfare
recipients to enter the workforce.3 0 9 However, it is less clear
whether the Court would accept as legitimate the third goal of the
per-child allotment legislation - discouraging AFDC recipients
from parenting additional children.
In considering this goal, a distinction must be made between
"illicit" sexual activity, in which the state may assert a legitimate
interest,3 1 0 and non-illicit sexual activity, in which the state holds
no legitimate interest. 3 1 ' The New Jersey legislature has stated
that one of its goals is discouraging AFDC recipients from parent-.
ing additional children.312 Procreation is not considered to be "illicit" sexual activity.3 1 3 Given the Court's continued support of the
fundamental right to procreate,3 1 4 this goal should not be viewed as
304. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970); Doe v. Revitz, 830 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1987); Largo v. Sunn, 835
F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1987); Guidice v. Jackson, 726 F. Supp. 632, 638 (E.D.Va. 1989).
305. See supra notes 95 and 101.
306. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
307. Id. at 318.
308. 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
309. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 483-84, 486 (accepting as legitimate
the State's goal of encouraging employment in support of a statute imposing a maximum cap on AFDC benefits).
310. See supra notes 174-229 and accompanying text (discussing the Equal Protection standard of review).
311. Id.
312. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
314. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.-,
112 S. Ct. 2791, 1992 U.S. Lexis 4751, 120 L.Ed. 2d 674, 60 U.S.L.W. 4795, 18 Family Law Reporter 2051, 2056 (1992).
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legitimate. 3 15 Although the Court grants government wide latitude
to enact legislation aimed at social welfare or economic goals, 3 16 as
indicated in Moreno, the Court stops short of allowing legislation
that lacks legitimacy. That is, in Moreno, the Court held that the
purpose of the legislation - to prevent "hippie communes" from
participating in the food stamp program - was not legitimate: "[i]f
the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."317
Although the goal of discouraging AFDC recipients from having additional children is not legitimate,3'8 the goals of saving
3
money and encouraging employment most likely are legitimate. 19
Because equal protection analysis under the rational basis framework does not require all the goals to be legitimate,320 this legislation could well pass the first prong of the equal protection analysis.
The next inquiry in the equal protection analysis must ask whether
the means -

the classes which the legislation establishes -

are

rationally related to achieving the State's legitimate goals?
2. Analysis of Means -

Rationally Related to Ends?

Under rational basis review in the equal protection arena, the
means chosen to achieve a state's legitimate goals do not necessarily have to be the most reasonable, so long as the classification established by the state is not "wholly arbitrary," or "wholly without
any rational basis."321 Even where the legislation will result in unfairness or deprivation, the Court has upheld laws that promote 3le22
gitimate ends and are supported by rationally related means.
However, the Court has held that the classification must not have
315. See also New Jersey Hearings, supra note 7, at 9X, July 31, 1991 (written
statement from Edward Martone, executive director, American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey) (stating, "there is no legitimate state interest in punishing a woman
for not delaying childbirth").
316. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at 318 (noting that "[there is no question
that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each
State is free to set its own standard of need"). See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S.
635, 637 (upholding an amendment to the food stamp benefits scheme even though
the Court recognized that the change "will impose a severe hardship on a needy
family").
317. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538, 534.
318. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
319. King, 392 U.S. at 318; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633; Dandridge,397 U.S. at 48384, 486.
320. Nowak, supra note 185, § 14.3, at 587-90.
321. Id.; Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 27-28; Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635,639
n.3.
322. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 3016-17.
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been established merely to deny a benefit to a group disfavored by
the legislature,323 and the Court has held that irrational fears and
prejudices against a class of individuals will not justify otherwise
legitimate legislation that unreasonably burdens that class.324

a.

Saving Money

Although the goal of saving money generally is considered legitimate,32 5 the means employed by the per-child allotment legislation are completely without rational basis. First, the Congressional
Budget Office not only reported that these types of financial deprivations do not work, but went on to recommend alternatives, including increased welfare payments, increased education and better
economic opportunities as more effective means by which to reduce
the AFDC rolls.326 Second, the state has no proof it will save any
money at all - in fact, the law may cost the state more in the long
run.3 27 Third, most young AFDC mothers - the population
targeted by the New Jersey law - leave the program within three
years and, therefore, are not draining state coffers for years on
end.3 28 By reducing or eliminating the additional benefit, per-child
allotment laws deprive children of the financial benefits necessary
to keep them adequately housed, clothed, and fed.329 Moreover,

these deprivations will affect children already covered by AFDC as
well as children subsequently born into the AFDC recipient's famfly, since the already inadequate funding will be stretched even further to meet the needs of a larger family.330
By classifying AFDC recipients according to whether children
were born prior to enrollment or after, and by denying benefits to
those children born after AFDC enrollment, the government is
making a wholly arbitrary distinction based on irrational
prejudices against the poor. 33 1 This type of reasoning and this sort
323. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451.

324. Id. at 449.
325. King, 392 U.S. at 318; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633.

326. ADOLESCENT MoTH s, supra note 11, at 43, 68-69.
327. New Jersey Hearings, supra note 7 (Legislative Fiscal Estimate, Assembly
Bill 4703, Sept. 12, 1991) (noting that the legislature "cannot readily determine" exactly how much money will be saved); Academics, supra note 242; see supra notes
252-56; Carter, supra note 273.
328. ADOLESCENT MOTrEas, supra note 11, at xvi.
329. WIScoNsN BmEFs, supra note 6, at 3.
330. Id. The Wisconsin legislature reports that critics of its Parent and Family
Responsibility (PFR) program assert that AFDC increases for additional children
already are "so low that they do not adequately cover the cost of additional children."
Id. at 7.
331. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
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of irrational classification have been held unconstitutional in the
3 3 2
and should be today as well.
past
b. Encourage Employment
Having found that the goal of encouraging employment is
probably legitimate,3 3 3 we must determine whether the per-child
allotment legislation rationally supports that goal. The reasoning
behind this goal ignores key facts. First, the goal of encouraging
employment is already being addressed.33 4 Second, jobs for this
population are scarce;3 3 5 welfare families are often unable to procure the jobs that are available. Third, even if jobs were available
and the AFDC parent was qualified for the jobs,6 the costs of child33
care often more than offset the wages earned.
The goal of encouraging AFDC parents to seek employment is
already being addressed through other means. 33 7 In Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno,3 38 the Court held unconstitutional a classification that
discriminated against hippies. 3 39 In part, the Court's reasoning
was based on the fact that the state's only legitimate goal preventing fraud - was already being addressed.34 0 Here, New
Jersey has already implemented programs for education and job
training in an effort to encourage AFDC recipients to seek employment. 34 1 Like the means in Moreno, this law constitutes invidious
discrimination and is not reasonably related to the state's goal.
Therefore, the law should be declared violative of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection.
Moreover, New Jersey's goal can not possibly be achieved by
these means in today's depressed job market, as was assumed in
Dandridge v. Williams.34 2 In Dandridge, the goal of encouraging
welfare recipients to seek employment was proffered by the state
and accepted by the Court.3 4 3 There, the legislation in question set
a maximum grant allotment for AFDC recipients, which the Court
332. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
333. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 524 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
334. See supra note 11.
335. HACKER, supra note 11; DeParle, supra note 11.

336. See supra note 11 (discussing the lack of education, job training, and skills,
as well as day care, as reasons many AFDC mothers are unable to obtain
employment).
337. See supra note 11.
338. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
339. Id. at 534.
340. Id. at 537.
341. See supra note 11.
342. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
343. Id. at 490.
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upheld,344 while giving the state considerable deference. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas noted that the Court's acceptance
of the state's argument = that a maximum cap on benefits would
encourage employment - rested on the supposition that the AFDC
recipients were, in fact, employable.345 The majority simply viewed
the statute as economic-social welfare legislation and accepted the
state's assertions as rational. As Justice Douglas observed, however, limitations on AFDC benefits "cannot reasonably operate as a
work incentive with regard to those who cannot work or who cannot
be expected to work;"346 additionally, this reasoning ignores the
very people whom AFDC was intended to benefit - dependent
children.347
The elimination of the per-child allotment is distinguishable
from the legislation in question in Dandridgewhich applied to all
AFDC families; 348 the legislation in question here applies only to
children born while the parent is enrolled in AFDC. The New
Jersey classification should cause today's Court to adopt a less deferential stance. If today's Court were to consider the realities of the
modern job market and the AFDC recipient, 349 the Court would
have to agree with Justice Douglas: denying a child AFDC benefits
merely because he was born after - instead of before - his parent

enrolled in AFDC cannot possibly further the state's goal of encouraging employment if there are no jobs available, if the parent is
unemployable, or if daycare costs would swallow the parent's
paycheck.
Thus, the goal asserted, like Moreno, is already being addressed in other, more reasonable ways. Also, the classification is
not rational, like Dandridge, and cannot possibly support the
state's goal.
c. DiscourageProcreation
The third goal of the New Jersey per-child allotment legislation -

discouraging AFDC recipients from procreating -

is not le-

344. Id.
345. Id. 490-508.
346. Dandridge,397 U.S. at 524.
347. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
348. Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471, 490 (1970).
349. See Edelman, supra note 1, at 74-76 (reporting that first, even a full-time
minimum wage job provides a paycheck equal to only 75% of the poverty level for a

family of three; second, there is no evidence that the poor are unwilling to work - in
fact, the evidence is contrary to that notion, with the number of Americans working
at minimum wage jobs quadrupling from 1979 to 1984; and third, "only four percent
of all families receive as much as half of their income from AFDC during the period
they are raising their children").
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gitimate, 35 0 but even if it were, the means are not rationally related
to the ends. Inasmuch as Congress prohibits states from requiring
AFDC recipients to accept birth control services as a prerequisite to
receiving aid,351 this legislation is unreasonable and irrational.
Although facially the per-child allotment legislation does not predicate eligibility for AFDC on a recipient's acceptance of birth control
services, the effect is the same. If the recipient does not prevent the
birth of a child while enrolled in AFDC, the recipient will not receive aid for that child.352 Like the legislation in King v. Smith,353
this legislation violates the purposes of the AFDC program and
should be held invalid.
In King v. Smith, the Court said that although states may
have a legitimate interest in discouraging immorality and illegitimacy, those interests are not legitimate justifications for excluding
35 4
otherwise eligible dependent children from the AFDC program.
The same argument can be made here. By eliminating the perchild allotment, the New Jersey legislature is attempting to achieve
its goal by establishing an irrational classification based on invidious discrimination. As a result, the legislature is punishing innocent children for behavior over which neither they nor, in many
cases, their parents, have any control. 355 Moreover, as the Court
noted in King, such discriminatory actions violate the very purpose
of AFDC - protecting dependent children. By classifying children
of AFDC recipients according to whether the children were born
before or after enrollment in AFDC, and by denying benefits to children born after enrollment, the government is making a wholly arbitrary distinction based on irrational prejudices against AFDC
recipients. The Court has already determined that this type of reasoning and the resulting classifications are unconstitutional.
In Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,356 the Court held that the legislature may not enact laws merely to thrust the majoritarian ideas of
350. See Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. -,
112 S. Ct. 2791, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 4751, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 60 U.S.L.W. 4795, 18
Family Law Reporter 2051, 2056 (1992); see also supra note 314.

351. 42 U.S.C.S. § 605(15XA).
352. See supra note 4.
353. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
354. King, 392 U.S. at 321, 334. Although King was decided on statutory
grounds, the Court conducted an extensive equal protection analysis.
355. New Jersey Hearings,supra note 7, at 43 (July 9, 1991 statement of Martha
Davis, staff attorney for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund); id. at 31-33
(statement of May Daniels, Ed.D., noting that even the most diligent use of birth
control is not always effective); id. at 26 (statement of Margaret Woods, Executive
Director of Independence High School).
356. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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morality onto a politically unpopular group. 3 57 The Court stated
that government may not accomplish even a legitimate goal by establishing "'invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.' "358 In Moreno, the unpopular group was hippies. Here, the
unpopular group is the children of welfare mothers who have the
audacity to parent children while enrolled in AFDC. In Moreno,
some households were denied food stamps solely because they included people who were not related to others in the household.
Here, a third or subsequent child effectively would be denied benefits because the child is related to the other children and was born
after the family enrolled in AFDC. Moreno can be distinguished,
opponents assert, because there the entire household was excluded
from the food stamp program, while here only the second or subsequent child would effectively be excluded from the AFDC program.
In Moreno, the legislative record included a statement that
the legislature sought to prevent "hippie communes" from participating in the food stamp program. 3 5 9 The Court held this to be violative of the constitutional guarantee to equal protection, noting
that the "purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of
itself and without reference to (some independent) considerations
in the public interest, justify the . . . amendment."360 The state
offered another goal - prevention of fraud - which the Court did
accept as legitimate. However, the Court said the classification the denial of "essential federal food assistance to all otherwise eligible households containing unrelated members" - could not consti3
tute a rational means by which to achieve that goal. 61
Here, the legislative record includes a statement that the legislation is intended to discourage AFDC recipients from parenting
additional children.362 Because this goal, like that in Moreno,
would deny essential federal food assistance to otherwise eligible
children (but for the timing of their birth, they would receive AFDC
benefits), the classification used to achieve the state's asserted goals
should not be considered rational.
The Court has also held that irrational fears and prejudices
against a class of individuals will not justify otherwise legitimate
legislation that unreasonably burdens that class.363 In Cleburne v.
357.
543.
358.
543.
359.
360.
361.
362.

King, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449; Moreno, 413 U.S. at
King, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449; Moreno, 413 U.S. at
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
Id. (quoting the District Court opinion).
Id. at 535-36.
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.

363. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
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Cleburne Living Ctr.,364 the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance
that prohibited the establishment of a home for mentally retarded
individuals in a residential neighborhood.365 Reviewing all of the
asserted state goals,366 only some of which the Court recognized as

potentially legitimate,367 the Court concluded that the classification was based on irrational prejudices against the mentally retarded and therefore could not rationally support the state
interests.3 68
Like the legislation in Cleburne, the per-child allotment legislation establishes a class of innocents who will be burdened solely
because of the state's irrational prejudices and misconceptions.
Moreover, the classification should not be considered rational because, as in Cleburne, other similarly situated individuals are not
burdened by the legislation. By focusing solely on children born
while the parent is enrolled in AFDC, the state is burdening children born after, but not before, enrollment. The state is thus sending a message that people receiving AFDC should not bear children
at the state's expense,3 69 just as the state in Cleburne was sending
a message that the mentally retarded were not welcome to establish a home in residential neighborhoods in that city. Where the
legislation in Cleburne was based on irrational notions about the
mentally retarded, the per-child allotment legislation is based on
irrational perceptions and prejudices regarding AFDC recipients'
sexual activities - that a welfare mother has a child in order to
receive additional allotments, and that she has many out-of-wedlock children, each with different fathers. As a result, the classifica364. Id.
365. Id. at 450.
366. Id. The interests in Cleburne included concerns that neighboring residents
would harbor "negative attitudes" toward or be fearful of the mentally retarded residents, fears that junior high students might harass the residents, an assertion that
the home was located on a five-hundred year flood plain, and concern that the size of
the home and the number of occupants would be too great. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
448-49.
367. The Court indicated that the city council's concerns regarding the flood plain
and the size of the house and number of occupants could be considered legitimate.
Id. at 449-50.
368. The city council's concerns regarding locating the home on a flood plain and
concerns regarding the size of the home and the number of occupants could not pass
the Court's rationality review because the city council allowed boarding and fraternity houses, nursing homes, and hospitals to be located in the area. The Court saw
no rational basis for prohibiting the location of a home for the mentally retarded
while allowing the other uses. Id. at 449.
369. This argument is especially offensive given the states' assertions in the abortion funding cases-and the Court's approval of those assertions-that promoting
childbirth over abortion is a legitimate interest rationally supported by the states'
decisions not to fund abortions. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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tion constitutes invidious discrimination against the poor and
should not be considered a rational means by which to achieve the
state's asserted goals.
The classification established by the per-child allotment legislation should not be considered rationally supportive of the goal of
discouraging births among AFDC recipients because the classification is simply an attempt to influence the morality of a disfavored
group and because the state is treating similarly situated children
differently based solely on irrational fears and prejudices.

M. Conclusion
Laws eliminating the incremental benefit for children born to
AFDC recipients are based on irrational prejudices and are not effective means by which to attain the goals intended. First, conservation of resources under such laws is unlikely. Legislatures have
no proof that such measures will save money at all, and the measures could actually cost the state and federal governments more in
the long run. Further, most AFDC families do not tend to bear additional children while enrolled in the program. Second, these laws
are unlikely to modify the behavior legislators are targeting - that
of discouraging AFDC recipients from procreating in order to receive an additional benefit. No evidence shows that AFDC families
exhibit such behavior in the first place, and, even if such behavior
were evident, experts question whether withholding benefits would
act as a deterrent. Third, those states citing the goal of encouraging AFDC recipients to enter the workforce ignore the fact that
most AFDC recipients prefer to work, and would work if jobs were
available to them. Proponents of per-child allotment laws as a
means to obtain this goal also overlook the daycare dilemma facing
AFDC recipients.
In sum, laws eliminating the per-child allotment punish children -

the intended beneficiaries of the AFDC program -

for the

alleged misconduct of their parents. Such laws are unconstitutional, unreasonable, and punitive.

